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authorChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>2020-06-08 21:34:27 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-06-09 09:39:15 -0700
commiteab0c6089b68974ebc6a9a7eab68456eeb6a99c7 (patch)
tree6b03656fac37fc4c4e43c74e33a5fd5b9f3d2b68 /arch
parentcd0309058f849257f08d1a3dd0c384d1fd20c1e8 (diff)
maccess: unify the probe kernel arch hooks
Currently architectures have to override every routine that probes kernel memory, which includes a pure read and strcpy, both in strict and not strict variants. Just provide a single arch hooks instead to make sure all architectures cover all the cases. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix !CONFIG_X86_64 build] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-11-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/um/kernel/maccess.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/maccess.c33
3 files changed, 20 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c b/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c
index beceaab34ecb..5b75c35d1da0 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c
@@ -57,14 +57,10 @@ void * memcpy(void * dst,const void *src, size_t count)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(raw_copy_in_user);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy);
-long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+bool probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size, bool strict)
{
- unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)src;
-
- if (addr < PAGE_SIZE)
- return -EFAULT;
-
+ if ((unsigned long)unsafe_src < PAGE_SIZE)
+ return false;
/* check for I/O space F_EXTEND(0xfff00000) access as well? */
-
- return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size);
+ return true;
}
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/maccess.c b/arch/um/kernel/maccess.c
index 67b2e0fa92bb..ad2c538ce497 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/maccess.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/maccess.c
@@ -7,15 +7,13 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <os.h>
-long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
+bool probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *src, size_t size, bool strict)
{
void *psrc = (void *)rounddown((unsigned long)src, PAGE_SIZE);
if ((unsigned long)src < PAGE_SIZE || size <= 0)
- return -EFAULT;
-
+ return false;
if (os_mincore(psrc, size + src - psrc) <= 0)
- return -EFAULT;
-
- return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size);
+ return false;
+ return true;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
index 62c4017a2473..86000c1150e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
@@ -9,35 +9,26 @@ static __always_inline u64 canonical_address(u64 vaddr, u8 vaddr_bits)
return ((s64)vaddr << (64 - vaddr_bits)) >> (64 - vaddr_bits);
}
-static __always_inline bool invalid_probe_range(u64 vaddr)
+bool probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size, bool strict)
{
+ unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)unsafe_src;
+
+ if (!strict)
+ return true;
+
/*
* Range covering the highest possible canonical userspace address
* as well as non-canonical address range. For the canonical range
* we also need to include the userspace guard page.
*/
- return vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE ||
- canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits) != vaddr;
+ return vaddr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE &&
+ canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits) == vaddr;
}
#else
-static __always_inline bool invalid_probe_range(u64 vaddr)
+bool probe_kernel_read_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size, bool strict)
{
- return vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ if (!strict)
+ return true;
+ return (unsigned long)unsafe_src >= TASK_SIZE_MAX;
}
#endif
-
-long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size)
-{
- if (unlikely(invalid_probe_range((unsigned long)src)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size);
-}
-
-long strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)
-{
- if (unlikely(invalid_probe_range((unsigned long)unsafe_addr)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- return __strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_addr, count);
-}