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authorRobin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>2017-01-05 17:15:01 +0000
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2017-01-11 08:02:18 +0100
commit488debb9971bc7d0edd6d8080ba78ca02a04f6c4 (patch)
tree7f97b8edd11003152eefcd45345cb23fe617643e /drivers/char/mem.c
parent7ee7f45a763bd68c3a606595a8c1bb08c3e6146b (diff)
drivers: char: mem: Fix thinkos in kmem address checks
When borrowing the pfn_valid() check from mmap_kmem(), somebody managed to get physical and virtual addresses spectacularly muddled up, such that we've ended up with checks for one being the other. Whilst this does indeed prevent out-of-bounds accesses crashing, on most systems it also prevents the more desirable use-case of working at all ever. Check the *virtual* offset correctly for what it is. Furthermore, do so in the right place - a read or write may span multiple pages, so a single up-front check is insufficient. High memory accesses already have a similar validity check just before the copy_to_user() call, so just make the low memory path fully consistent with that. Reported-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 148a1bc84398 ("drivers: char: mem: Check {read,write}_kmem() addresses") Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/mem.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/mem.c10
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 5bb1985ec484..6d9cc2d39d22 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -381,9 +381,6 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vread() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
int err = 0;
- if (!pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(p)))
- return -EIO;
-
read = 0;
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
low_count = count;
@@ -412,6 +409,8 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
* by the kernel or data corruption may occur
*/
kbuf = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p);
+ if (!virt_addr_valid(kbuf))
+ return -ENXIO;
if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, sz))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -482,6 +481,8 @@ static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const char __user *buf,
* corruption may occur.
*/
ptr = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p);
+ if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
+ return -ENXIO;
copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz);
if (copied) {
@@ -512,9 +513,6 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
int err = 0;
- if (!pfn_valid(PFN_DOWN(p)))
- return -EIO;
-
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);