diff options
| author | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2018-07-17 18:24:27 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2018-07-24 15:43:24 -0400 |
| commit | 39a8883a2b989d1d21bd8dd99f5557f0c5e89694 (patch) | |
| tree | 9e86c920e258b8ca73ffa3955cd82c6c1ee84cea /drivers/char/random.c | |
| parent | 3672476edaa0660eb833f54fa9edeb505417b75c (diff) | |
random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
This gives the user building their own kernel (or a Linux
distribution) the option of deciding whether or not to trust the CPU's
hardware random number generator (e.g., RDRAND for x86 CPU's) as being
correctly implemented and not having a back door introduced (perhaps
courtesy of a Nation State's law enforcement or intelligence
agencies).
This will prevent getrandom(2) from blocking, if there is a
willingness to trust the CPU manufacturer.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 34ddfd57419b..f4013b8a711b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) { int i; + int arch_init = 1; unsigned long rv; memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); @@ -792,10 +793,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) + !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); + arch_init = 0; + } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU + if (arch_init) { + crng_init = 2; + pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); + } +#endif crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } |