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authorBen Seri <ben@armis.com>2017-12-08 15:14:47 +0100
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-01-04 17:01:01 +0100
commit06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 (patch)
tree12e6183122611cbfe9468bc7c6e2a91a92ec4ed1 /drivers/mux
parent30a7acd573899fd8b8ac39236eff6468b195ac7d (diff)
Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without initialization: struct l2cap_conf_efs efs; In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the memcpy call that will write to the efs variable: ... case L2CAP_CONF_EFS: if (olen == sizeof(efs)) memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen); ... The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built: l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs); So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the attacker (16 bytes). This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410 Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/mux')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions