bnxt_en: Propagate trusted VF attribute to firmware.

Newer firmware understands the concept of a trusted VF, so propagate the
trusted VF attribute set by the PF admin. to the firmware.  Also, check
the firmware trusted setting when considering the VF MAC address change
and reporting the trusted setting to the user.

Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 54 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
index d80f5c981d90..2b90a2bb1a1d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
@@ -121,6 +121,54 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool setting)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+{
+	struct hwrm_func_qcfg_output *resp = bp->hwrm_cmd_resp_addr;
+	struct hwrm_func_qcfg_input req = {0};
+	int rc;
+
+	bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(bp, &req, HWRM_FUNC_QCFG, -1, -1);
+	req.fid = cpu_to_le16(vf->fw_fid);
+	mutex_lock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
+	rc = _hwrm_send_message(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT);
+	if (rc) {
+		mutex_unlock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	vf->func_qcfg_flags = le16_to_cpu(resp->flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+{
+	if (!(bp->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
+		return !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST);
+
+	bnxt_hwrm_func_qcfg_flags(bp, vf);
+	return !!(vf->func_qcfg_flags & FUNC_QCFG_RESP_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF);
+}
+
+static int bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+{
+	struct hwrm_func_cfg_input req = {0};
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(bp->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
+		return 0;
+
+	bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(bp, &req, HWRM_FUNC_CFG, -1, -1);
+	req.fid = cpu_to_le16(vf->fw_fid);
+	if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST)
+		req.flags = cpu_to_le32(FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_ENABLE);
+	else
+		req.flags = cpu_to_le32(FUNC_CFG_REQ_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_DISABLE);
+	rc = hwrm_send_message(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT);
+	if (rc)
+		return -EIO;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trusted)
 {
 	struct bnxt *bp = netdev_priv(dev);
@@ -135,6 +183,7 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trusted)
 	else
 		vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
 
+	bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(bp, vf);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -164,7 +213,7 @@ int bnxt_get_vf_config(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id,
 	else
 		ivi->qos = 0;
 	ivi->spoofchk = !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK);
-	ivi->trusted = !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST);
+	ivi->trusted = bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf);
 	if (!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_LINK_FORCED))
 		ivi->linkstate = IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_AUTO;
 	else if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_LINK_UP)
@@ -935,9 +984,10 @@ static int bnxt_vf_configure_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
 	 * if the PF assigned MAC address is zero
 	 */
 	if (req->enables & cpu_to_le32(FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_DFLT_MAC_ADDR)) {
+		bool trust = bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf);
+
 		if (is_valid_ether_addr(req->dflt_mac_addr) &&
-		    ((vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) ||
-		     !is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr) ||
+		    (trust || !is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr) ||
 		     ether_addr_equal(req->dflt_mac_addr, vf->mac_addr))) {
 			ether_addr_copy(vf->vf_mac_addr, req->dflt_mac_addr);
 			return bnxt_hwrm_exec_fwd_resp(bp, vf, msg_size);
@@ -962,7 +1012,7 @@ static int bnxt_vf_validate_set_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
 	 * Otherwise, it must match the VF MAC address if firmware spec >=
 	 * 1.2.2
 	 */
-	if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) {
+	if (bnxt_is_trusted_vf(bp, vf)) {
 		mac_ok = true;
 	} else if (is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr)) {
 		if (ether_addr_equal((const u8 *)req->l2_addr, vf->mac_addr))