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authorJacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>2023-02-22 09:09:20 -0800
committerTony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>2023-03-13 11:06:06 -0700
commitbe96815c616822d3800405b8fbebe3e069d6eed2 (patch)
tree9e9e7d1c74966b07d9962b48791ec1cd305d3f2c /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
parentc414463ab1bb098e67f4c1a4ef64f3e97780f087 (diff)
ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg()
The main loop in __ice_clean_ctrlq first checks if a VF might be malicious before calling ice_vc_process_vf_msg(). This results in duplicate code in both functions to obtain a reference to the VF, and exports the ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_virtchnl.c unnecessarily. Refactor ice_is_malicious_vf() to be a static function that takes a pointer to the VF. Call this in ice_vc_process_vf_msg() just after we obtain a reference to the VF by calling ice_get_vf_by_id. Pass the mailbox data from the __ice_clean_ctrlq function into ice_vc_process_vf_msg() instead of calling ice_is_malicious_vf(). This reduces the number of exported functions and avoids the need to obtain the VF reference twice for every mailbox message. Note that the state check for ICE_VF_STATE_DIS is kept in ice_is_malicious_vf() and we call this before checking that state in ice_vc_process_vf_msg. This is intentional, as we stop responding to VF messages from a VF once we detect that it may be overflowing the mailbox. This ensures that we continue to silently ignore the message as before without responding via ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(). Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c36
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
index e0c573d9d1b9..97243c616d5d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
@@ -3834,27 +3834,26 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf)
}
/**
- * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF
- * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf
- * @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * ice_is_malicious_vf - check if this vf might be overflowing mailbox
+ * @vf: the VF to check
* @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
+ *
+ * Detect if a given VF might be malicious and attempting to overflow the PF
+ * mailbox. If so, log a warning message and ignore this event.
*/
-bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
- struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
+static bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
- s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
- struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
bool report_malvf = false;
- struct ice_vf *vf;
+ struct device *dev;
+ struct ice_pf *pf;
int status;
- vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id);
- if (!vf)
- return false;
+ pf = vf->pf;
+ dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
- goto out_put_vf;
+ return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
/* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
@@ -3872,9 +3871,6 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
}
-out_put_vf:
- ice_put_vf(vf);
-
return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
}
@@ -3882,11 +3878,13 @@ out_put_vf:
* ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF
* @pf: pointer to the PF structure
* @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * @mbxdata: information used to detect VF attempting mailbox overflow
*
* called from the common asq/arq handler to
* process request from VF
*/
-void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
+void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
u32 v_opcode = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.cookie_high);
s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
@@ -3908,6 +3906,10 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+ /* Check if the VF is trying to overflow the mailbox */
+ if (ice_is_malicious_vf(vf, mbxdata))
+ goto finish;
+
/* Check if VF is disabled. */
if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) {
err = -EPERM;