diff options
author | Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> | 2023-02-22 09:09:20 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> | 2023-03-13 11:06:06 -0700 |
commit | be96815c616822d3800405b8fbebe3e069d6eed2 (patch) | |
tree | 9e9e7d1c74966b07d9962b48791ec1cd305d3f2c /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | |
parent | c414463ab1bb098e67f4c1a4ef64f3e97780f087 (diff) |
ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg()
The main loop in __ice_clean_ctrlq first checks if a VF might be malicious
before calling ice_vc_process_vf_msg(). This results in duplicate code in
both functions to obtain a reference to the VF, and exports the
ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_virtchnl.c unnecessarily.
Refactor ice_is_malicious_vf() to be a static function that takes a pointer
to the VF. Call this in ice_vc_process_vf_msg() just after we obtain a
reference to the VF by calling ice_get_vf_by_id.
Pass the mailbox data from the __ice_clean_ctrlq function into
ice_vc_process_vf_msg() instead of calling ice_is_malicious_vf().
This reduces the number of exported functions and avoids the need to obtain
the VF reference twice for every mailbox message.
Note that the state check for ICE_VF_STATE_DIS is kept in
ice_is_malicious_vf() and we call this before checking that state in
ice_vc_process_vf_msg. This is intentional, as we stop responding to VF
messages from a VF once we detect that it may be overflowing the mailbox.
This ensures that we continue to silently ignore the message as before
without responding via ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf().
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 36 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c index e0c573d9d1b9..97243c616d5d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c @@ -3834,27 +3834,26 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) } /** - * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF - * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf - * @event: pointer to the AQ event + * ice_is_malicious_vf - check if this vf might be overflowing mailbox + * @vf: the VF to check * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox + * + * Detect if a given VF might be malicious and attempting to overflow the PF + * mailbox. If so, log a warning message and ignore this event. */ -bool -ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, - struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) +static bool +ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) { - s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval); - struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); bool report_malvf = false; - struct ice_vf *vf; + struct device *dev; + struct ice_pf *pf; int status; - vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id); - if (!vf) - return false; + pf = vf->pf; + dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf); if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) - goto out_put_vf; + return vf->mbx_info.malicious; /* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */ status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info, @@ -3872,9 +3871,6 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr); } -out_put_vf: - ice_put_vf(vf); - return vf->mbx_info.malicious; } @@ -3882,11 +3878,13 @@ out_put_vf: * ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF * @pf: pointer to the PF structure * @event: pointer to the AQ event + * @mbxdata: information used to detect VF attempting mailbox overflow * * called from the common asq/arq handler to * process request from VF */ -void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event) +void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, + struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata) { u32 v_opcode = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.cookie_high); s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval); @@ -3908,6 +3906,10 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event) mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + /* Check if the VF is trying to overflow the mailbox */ + if (ice_is_malicious_vf(vf, mbxdata)) + goto finish; + /* Check if VF is disabled. */ if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) { err = -EPERM; |