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authorJacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>2023-02-22 09:09:19 -0800
committerTony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>2023-03-13 11:06:06 -0700
commitc414463ab1bb098e67f4c1a4ef64f3e97780f087 (patch)
treef5abcd8b3d9975bac7d282deb344782c00e61cb7 /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
parent4508bf02bf8a3de8fb65869f40dfdef74dc1b339 (diff)
ice: move ice_is_malicious_vf() to ice_virtchnl.c
The ice_is_malicious_vf() function is currently implemented in ice_sriov.c This function is not Single Root specific, and a future change is going to refactor the ice_vc_process_vf_msg() function to call this instead of calling it before ice_vc_process_vf_msg() in the main loop of __ice_clean_ctrlq. To make that change easier to review, first move this function into ice_virtchnl.c but leave the call in __ice_clean_ctrlq() alone. Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c45
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
index e24e3f5017ca..e0c573d9d1b9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
@@ -3834,6 +3834,51 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf)
}
/**
+ * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF
+ * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf
+ * @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
+ */
+bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
+{
+ s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
+ struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
+ bool report_malvf = false;
+ struct ice_vf *vf;
+ int status;
+
+ vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id);
+ if (!vf)
+ return false;
+
+ if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
+ goto out_put_vf;
+
+ /* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
+ status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
+ &report_malvf);
+ if (status)
+ dev_warn_ratelimited(dev, "Unable to check status of mailbox overflow for VF %u MAC %pM, status %d\n",
+ vf->vf_id, vf->dev_lan_addr, status);
+
+ if (report_malvf) {
+ struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf);
+ u8 zero_addr[ETH_ALEN] = {};
+
+ dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n",
+ vf->dev_lan_addr,
+ pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
+ }
+
+out_put_vf:
+ ice_put_vf(vf);
+
+ return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
+}
+
+/**
* ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF
* @pf: pointer to the PF structure
* @event: pointer to the AQ event