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authorJacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>2022-02-16 16:51:36 -0800
committerTony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>2022-03-08 13:31:08 -0800
commit79498d5af8e458102242d1667cf44df1f1564e63 (patch)
treebbebd7fb2e2ab5456faa742c8be036c6ee55c506 /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
parent5710ab79166504013f7c0ae6a57e7d2fd26e5c43 (diff)
ice: stop disabling VFs due to PF error responses
The ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf function has logic to detect "failure" responses being sent to a VF. If a VF is sent more than ICE_DFLT_NUM_INVAL_MSGS_ALLOWED then the VF is marked as disabled. Almost identical logic also existed in the i40e driver. This logic was added to the ice driver in commit 1071a8358a28 ("ice: Implement virtchnl commands for AVF support") which itself copied from the i40e implementation in commit 5c3c48ac6bf5 ("i40e: implement virtual device interface"). Neither commit provides a proper explanation or justification of the check. In fact, later commits to i40e changed the logic to allow bypassing the check in some specific instances. The "logic" for this seems to be that error responses somehow indicate a malicious VF. This is not really true. The PF might be sending an error for any number of reasons such as lack of resources, etc. Additionally, this causes the PF to log an info message for every failed VF response which may confuse users, and can spam the kernel log. This behavior is not documented as part of any requirement for our products and other operating system drivers such as the FreeBSD implementation of our drivers do not include this type of check. In fact, the change from dev_err to dev_info in i40e commit 18b7af57d9c1 ("i40e: Lower some message levels") explains that these messages typically don't actually indicate a real issue. It is quite likely that a user who hits this in practice will be very confused as the VF will be disabled without an obvious way to recover. We already have robust malicious driver detection logic using actual hardware detection mechanisms that detect and prevent invalid device usage. Remove the logic since its not a documented requirement and the behavior is not intuitive. Fixes: 1071a8358a28 ("ice: Implement virtchnl commands for AVF support") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <konrad0.jankowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c18
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
index 408f78e3eb13..1be3cd4b2bef 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
@@ -2182,24 +2182,6 @@ ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 v_opcode,
dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
- /* single place to detect unsuccessful return values */
- if (v_retval) {
- vf->num_inval_msgs++;
- dev_info(dev, "VF %d failed opcode %d, retval: %d\n", vf->vf_id,
- v_opcode, v_retval);
- if (vf->num_inval_msgs > ICE_DFLT_NUM_INVAL_MSGS_ALLOWED) {
- dev_err(dev, "Number of invalid messages exceeded for VF %d\n",
- vf->vf_id);
- dev_err(dev, "Use PF Control I/F to enable the VF\n");
- set_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states);
- return -EIO;
- }
- } else {
- vf->num_valid_msgs++;
- /* reset the invalid counter, if a valid message is received. */
- vf->num_inval_msgs = 0;
- }
-
aq_ret = ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(&pf->hw, vf->vf_id, v_opcode, v_retval,
msg, msglen, NULL);
if (aq_ret && pf->hw.mailboxq.sq_last_status != ICE_AQ_RC_ENOSYS) {