Merge branch 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Changes to the EFI init code to establish whether secure boot
     authentication was performed at boot time. (Josh Boyer, David
     Howells)

   - Wire up the UEFI memory attributes table for x86. This eliminates
     any runtime memory regions that are both writable and executable,
     on recent firmware versions. (Sai Praneeth)

   - Move the BGRT init code to an earlier stage so that we can still
     use efi_mem_reserve(). (Dave Young)

   - Preserve debug symbols in the ARM/arm64 UEFI stub (Ard Biesheuvel)

   - Code deduplication work and various other cleanups (Lukas Wunner)

   - ... plus various other fixes and cleanups"

* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
  efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
  efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
  efi: Get and store the secure boot status
  efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
  x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
  efi/libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
  efi/x86: Add debug code to print cooked memmap
  efi/x86: Move the EFI BGRT init code to early init code
  efi: Use typed function pointers for the runtime services table
  efi/esrt: Fix typo in pr_err() message
  x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE
  efi: Introduce the EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from the memory attributes table
  efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures
  x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk()
  efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close()

10 files changed, 208 insertions, 155 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
index 75f128e766a9..ca28aa572aa9 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c
@@ -15,40 +15,41 @@
 #include <linux/sysfs.h>
 #include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
 
+static void *bgrt_image;
 static struct kobject *bgrt_kobj;
 
 static ssize_t show_version(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->version);
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.version);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(version, S_IRUGO, show_version, NULL);
 
 static ssize_t show_status(struct device *dev,
 			   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->status);
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.status);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(status, S_IRUGO, show_status, NULL);
 
 static ssize_t show_type(struct device *dev,
 			 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_type);
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_type);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(type, S_IRUGO, show_type, NULL);
 
 static ssize_t show_xoffset(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_x);
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_x);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(xoffset, S_IRUGO, show_xoffset, NULL);
 
 static ssize_t show_yoffset(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_y);
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_y);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(yoffset, S_IRUGO, show_yoffset, NULL);
 
@@ -84,15 +85,24 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!bgrt_image)
+	if (!bgrt_tab.image_address)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab.image_address, bgrt_image_size,
+			      MEMREMAP_WB);
+	if (!bgrt_image) {
+		pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	bin_attr_image.private = bgrt_image;
 	bin_attr_image.size = bgrt_image_size;
 
 	bgrt_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bgrt", acpi_kobj);
-	if (!bgrt_kobj)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!bgrt_kobj) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_memmap;
+	}
 
 	ret = sysfs_create_group(bgrt_kobj, &bgrt_attribute_group);
 	if (ret)
@@ -102,6 +112,8 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void)
 
 out_kobject:
 	kobject_put(bgrt_kobj);
+out_memmap:
+	memunmap(bgrt_image);
 	return ret;
 }
 device_initcall(bgrt_init);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
index f853ad2c4ca0..1027d7b44358 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c
@@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
 	}
 
 	reserve_regions();
-	efi_memattr_init();
 	efi_esrt_init();
 	efi_memmap_unmap();
 
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 92914801e388..e7d404059b73 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
 		}
 	}
 
+	efi_memattr_init();
+
 	/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
 	if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
 		efi_properties_table_t *tbl;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
index 14914074f716..08b026864d4e 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void __init efi_esrt_init(void)
 	max -= efi.esrt;
 
 	if (max < size) {
-		pr_err("ESRT header doen't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n",
+		pr_err("ESRT header doesn't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n",
 		       size, max);
 		return;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d564d25df8ab..f7425960f6a5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86)		+= -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -O2 \
 				   -mno-mmx -mno-sse
 
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64)		:= $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
-cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM)		:= $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -g0 \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM)		:= $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
 				   -fno-builtin -fpic -mno-single-pic-base
 
 cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB)	+= -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT			:= n
 
-lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
 
 # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
 arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ CFLAGS_arm64-stub.o 		:= -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET)
 extra-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB)	:= $(lib-y)
 lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB)	:= $(patsubst %.o,%.stub.o,$(lib-y))
 
-STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y		:= -R .debug* -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab*
+STUBCOPY_RM-y			:= -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab*
 STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM64)	+= --prefix-alloc-sections=.init \
 				   --prefix-symbols=__efistub_
 STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64)	:= R_AARCH64_ABS
@@ -68,17 +68,25 @@ STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64)	:= R_AARCH64_ABS
 $(obj)/%.stub.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,stubcopy)
 
+#
+# Strip debug sections and some other sections that may legally contain
+# absolute relocations, so that we can inspect the remaining sections for
+# such relocations. If none are found, regenerate the output object, but
+# this time, use objcopy and leave all sections in place.
+#
 quiet_cmd_stubcopy = STUBCPY $@
-      cmd_stubcopy = if $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; then	\
-		     $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y)	\
-		     && (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \
-			 rm -f $@; /bin/false); else /bin/false; fi
+      cmd_stubcopy = if $(STRIP) --strip-debug $(STUBCOPY_RM-y) -o $@ $<; \
+		     then if $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y); \
+		     then (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \
+			   rm -f $@; /bin/false); 			  \
+		     else $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; fi	  \
+		     else /bin/false; fi
 
 #
 # ARM discards the .data section because it disallows r/w data in the
 # decompressor. So move our .data to .data.efistub, which is preserved
 # explicitly by the decompressor linker script.
 #
-STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM)	+= --rename-section .data=.data.efistub \
-				   -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort
+STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM)	+= --rename-section .data=.data.efistub
+STUBCOPY_RM-$(CONFIG_ARM)	+= -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort
 STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM)	:= R_ARM_ABS
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index b4f7d78f9e8b..d4056c6be1ec 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
 
 bool __nokaslr;
 
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
-	static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
-		'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
-	static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
-		'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
-	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-	efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
-	u8 val;
-	unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
-	efi_status_t status;
-
-	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
-			  NULL, &size, &val);
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	if (val == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
-			  NULL, &size, &val);
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	if (val == 1)
-		return 0;
-
-	return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
-	switch (status) {
-	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-		return 0;
-	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-		return -EIO;
-	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-		return -EACCES;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-}
-
 efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
 			     void *__image, void **__fh)
 {
@@ -91,75 +45,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
 	return status;
 }
 
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
-{
-	efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle;
-
-	return fh->close(handle);
-}
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
-{
-	efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle;
-
-	return fh->read(handle, size, addr);
-}
-
-
-efi_status_t
-efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
-	      efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz)
-{
-	efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh;
-	efi_file_info_t *info;
-	efi_status_t status;
-	efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
-	unsigned long info_sz;
-
-	status = fh->open(fh, &h, filename_16, EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: ");
-		efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16);
-		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n");
-		return status;
-	}
-
-	*handle = h;
-
-	info_sz = 0;
-	status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz, NULL);
-	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n");
-		return status;
-	}
-
-grow:
-	status = sys_table_arg->boottime->allocate_pool(EFI_LOADER_DATA,
-				 info_sz, (void **)&info);
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
-		return status;
-	}
-
-	status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz,
-						   info);
-	if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-		sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info);
-		goto grow;
-	}
-
-	*file_sz = info->file_size;
-	sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info);
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
-
-	return status;
-}
-
-
-
 void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
 			      efi_char16_t *str)
 {
@@ -226,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
 	efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
 	unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
 	unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
-	int secure_boot = 0;
+	enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
 	struct screen_info *si;
 
 	/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -296,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
 		pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
 
 	secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
-	if (secure_boot > 0)
-		pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-
-	if (secure_boot < 0) {
-		pr_efi_err(sys_table,
-			"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
-	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
-	 * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
+	 * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
+	 * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.  We assume that secure
+	 * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
 	 */
-	if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
+	if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
+	    strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
 		pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
 	} else {
 		status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
index 757badc1debb..919822b7773d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c
@@ -338,6 +338,69 @@ void efi_free(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, unsigned long size,
 	efi_call_early(free_pages, addr, nr_pages);
 }
 
+static efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
+				  efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle,
+				  u64 *file_sz)
+{
+	efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh;
+	efi_file_info_t *info;
+	efi_status_t status;
+	efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID;
+	unsigned long info_sz;
+
+	status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, open, fh, &h, filename_16,
+				EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: ");
+		efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16);
+		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n");
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	*handle = h;
+
+	info_sz = 0;
+	status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid,
+				&info_sz, NULL);
+	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n");
+		return status;
+	}
+
+grow:
+	status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+				info_sz, (void **)&info);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n");
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid,
+				&info_sz, info);
+	if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+		efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
+		goto grow;
+	}
+
+	*file_sz = info->file_size;
+	efi_call_early(free_pool, info);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n");
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+static efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr)
+{
+	return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, read, handle, size, addr);
+}
+
+static efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle)
+{
+	return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, close, handle);
+}
+
 /*
  * Parse the ASCII string 'cmdline' for EFI options, denoted by the efi=
  * option, e.g. efi=nochunk.
@@ -351,6 +414,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char *cmdline)
 	char *str;
 
 	/*
+	 * Currently, the only efi= option we look for is 'nochunk', which
+	 * is intended to work around known issues on certain x86 UEFI
+	 * versions. So ignore for now on other architectures.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86))
+		return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+	/*
 	 * If no EFI parameters were specified on the cmdline we've got
 	 * nothing to do.
 	 */
@@ -523,7 +594,8 @@ efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
 			size = files[j].size;
 			while (size) {
 				unsigned long chunksize;
-				if (size > __chunk_size)
+
+				if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86) && size > __chunk_size)
 					chunksize = __chunk_size;
 				else
 					chunksize = size;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
index 0e2a96b12cb3..71c4d0e3c4ed 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
@@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *);
 efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__image,
 			     void **__fh);
 
-efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh,
-			   efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle,
-			   u64 *file_sz);
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr);
-
-efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle);
-
 unsigned long get_dram_base(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
 
 efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6def402bf569
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ *     Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *     Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+	'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+	'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+/* SHIM variables */
+static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = {
+	'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+	efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+			 (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+			 __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+	u32 attr;
+	u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
+	unsigned long size;
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	size = sizeof(secboot);
+	status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+			     NULL, &size, &secboot);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto out_efi_err;
+
+	size = sizeof(setupmode);
+	status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+			     NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto out_efi_err;
+
+	if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+	/*
+	 * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+	 * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+	 * honor that.
+	 */
+	size = sizeof(moksbstate);
+	status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
+			     &attr, &size, &moksbstate);
+
+	/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto secure_boot_enabled;
+	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+secure_boot_enabled:
+	pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+	return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+out_efi_err:
+	pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+	if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+	return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
index 236004b9a50d..8986757eafaf 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_init(void)
 
 	tbl_size = sizeof(*tbl) + tbl->num_entries * tbl->desc_size;
 	memblock_reserve(efi.mem_attr_table, tbl_size);
+	set_bit(EFI_MEM_ATTR, &efi.flags);
 
 unmap:
 	early_memunmap(tbl, sizeof(*tbl));
@@ -174,8 +175,11 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				md.phys_addr + size - 1,
 				efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), &md));
 
-		if (valid)
+		if (valid) {
 			ret = fn(mm, &md);
+			if (ret)
+				pr_err("Error updating mappings, skipping subsequent md's\n");
+		}
 	}
 	memunmap(tbl);
 	return ret;