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authorJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>2016-05-04 22:05:01 -0700
committerJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>2016-05-07 10:32:33 -0700
commitb5a7aef1ef436ec005fef0efe31a676ec5f4ab31 (patch)
treec3eb022f963b70eadb066e8c87b7041236955289 /fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
parent09210c973af30320edc03a6325422cdd0f03b580 (diff)
fscrypto/f2fs: allow fs-specific key prefix for fs encryption
This patch allows fscrypto to handle a second key prefix given by filesystem. The main reason is to provide backward compatibility, since previously f2fs used "f2fs:" as a crypto prefix instead of "fscrypt:". Later, ext4 should also provide key_prefix() to give "ext4:". One concern decribed by Ted would be kinda double check overhead of prefixes. In x86, for example, validate_user_key consumes 8 ms after boot-up, which turns out derive_key_aes() consumed most of the time to load specific crypto module. After such the cold miss, it shows almost zero latencies, which treats as a negligible overhead. Note that request_key() detects wrong prefix in prior to derive_key_aes() even. Cc: Ted Tso <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6 Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/keyinfo.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyinfo.c120
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index 06f5aa478bf2..1ac263eddc4e 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -78,6 +78,67 @@ out:
return res;
}
+static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
+ struct fscrypt_context *ctx, u8 *raw_key,
+ u8 *prefix, int prefix_size)
+{
+ u8 *full_key_descriptor;
+ struct key *keyring_key;
+ struct fscrypt_key *master_key;
+ const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+ int full_key_len = prefix_size + (FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE * 2) + 1;
+ int res;
+
+ full_key_descriptor = kmalloc(full_key_len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!full_key_descriptor)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(full_key_descriptor, prefix, prefix_size);
+ sprintf(full_key_descriptor + prefix_size,
+ "%*phN", FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
+ ctx->master_key_descriptor);
+ full_key_descriptor[full_key_len - 1] = '\0';
+ keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, full_key_descriptor, NULL);
+ kfree(full_key_descriptor);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring_key))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
+
+ if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING
+ "%s: key type must be logon\n", __func__);
+ res = -ENOKEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+ ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
+ if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
+ res = -EINVAL;
+ up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ if (master_key->size != FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING
+ "%s: key size incorrect: %d\n",
+ __func__, master_key->size);
+ res = -ENOKEY;
+ up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ res = derive_key_aes(ctx->nonce, master_key->raw, raw_key);
+ up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+ if (res)
+ goto out;
+
+ crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
+ return 0;
+out:
+ key_put(keyring_key);
+ return res;
+}
+
static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
if (!ci)
@@ -91,12 +152,7 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
int get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
- u8 full_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE +
- (FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE * 2) + 1];
- struct key *keyring_key = NULL;
- struct fscrypt_key *master_key;
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
- const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
const char *cipher_str;
u8 raw_key[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
@@ -167,48 +223,24 @@ retry:
memset(raw_key, 0x42, FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
goto got_key;
}
- memcpy(full_key_descriptor, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
- FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE);
- sprintf(full_key_descriptor + FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE,
- "%*phN", FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
- ctx.master_key_descriptor);
- full_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE +
- (2 * FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE)] = '\0';
- keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, full_key_descriptor, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
- res = PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
- keyring_key = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
- if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING
- "%s: key type must be logon\n", __func__);
- res = -ENOKEY;
- goto out;
- }
- down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
- ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
- if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
- res = -EINVAL;
- up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
- goto out;
- }
- master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
- if (master_key->size != FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING
- "%s: key size incorrect: %d\n",
- __func__, master_key->size);
- res = -ENOKEY;
- up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+ res = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
+ FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE);
+ if (res && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
+ u8 *prefix = NULL;
+ int prefix_size, res2;
+
+ prefix_size = inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix(inode, &prefix);
+ res2 = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
+ prefix, prefix_size);
+ if (res2) {
+ if (res2 == -ENOKEY)
+ res = -ENOKEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (res) {
goto out;
}
- res = derive_key_aes(ctx.nonce, master_key->raw, raw_key);
- up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
- if (res)
- goto out;
got_key:
ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
if (!ctfm || IS_ERR(ctfm)) {