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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2017-10-09 12:51:27 -0700
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2017-10-12 17:16:40 +0100
commitf66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e (patch)
tree8bcdb1a0fa653b839656e246aeefa7484e17a025 /fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
parentd60b5b7854c3d135b869f74fb93eaf63cbb1991a (diff)
ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic because the payload of a revoked key is NULL. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we acquire the key semaphore. Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return -EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL. For completeness we check this for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys cannot be revoked currently. Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer. Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig") Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.19+] Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c9
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 3cf1546dca82..fa218cd64f74 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ out:
* @auth_tok_key: key containing the authentication token
* @auth_tok: authentication token
*
- * Returns zero on valid auth tok; -EINVAL otherwise
+ * Returns zero on valid auth tok; -EINVAL if the payload is invalid; or
+ * -EKEYREVOKED if the key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore.
*/
static int
ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
@@ -468,6 +469,12 @@ ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
int rc = 0;
(*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key);
+ if (IS_ERR(*auth_tok)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(*auth_tok);
+ *auth_tok = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Data structure version mismatch. Userspace "
"tools must match eCryptfs kernel module with major "