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authorChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>2023-10-05 19:08:35 +0200
committerChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>2023-10-19 11:02:49 +0200
commit6cf41fcfe099b61b4e3ea7dbe04a906f4c904822 (patch)
tree0586ef64ce77176e2cb86a9a17ad256e6ac6a5c9 /fs/file_table.c
parent7116c0af4b8414b2f19fdb366eea213cbd9d91c2 (diff)
backing file: free directly
Backing files as used by overlayfs are never installed into file descriptor tables and are explicitly documented as such. They aren't subject to rcu access conditions like regular files are. Their lifetime is bound to the lifetime of the overlayfs file, i.e., they're stashed in ovl_file->private_data and go away otherwise. If they're set as vma->vm_file - which is their main purpose - then they're subject to regular refcount rules and vma->vm_file can't be installed into an fdtable after having been set. All in all I don't see any need for rcu delay here. So free it directly. This all hinges on such hybrid beasts to never actually be installed into fdtables which - as mentioned before - is not allowed. So add an explicit WARN_ON_ONCE() so we catch any case where someone is suddenly trying to install one of those things into a file descriptor table so we can have a nice long chat with them. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005-sakralbau-wappnen-f5c31755ed70@brauner Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/file_table.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/file_table.c9
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index a79a80031343..08fd1dd6d863 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -61,13 +61,6 @@ struct path *backing_file_real_path(struct file *f)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_real_path);
-static void file_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct file *f = container_of(head, struct file, f_rcuhead);
-
- kfree(backing_file(f));
-}
-
static inline void file_free(struct file *f)
{
security_file_free(f);
@@ -76,7 +69,7 @@ static inline void file_free(struct file *f)
put_cred(f->f_cred);
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)) {
path_put(backing_file_real_path(f));
- call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead, file_free_rcu);
+ kfree(backing_file(f));
} else {
kmem_cache_free(filp_cachep, f);
}