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authorVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>2019-01-30 14:01:57 -0500
committerMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>2019-02-13 11:14:46 +0100
commit993a0b2aec52754f0897b1dab4c453be8217cae5 (patch)
treeb2e1d4fbcb37495bea2aaa9ecf3ba8562382f208 /fs/overlayfs
parent5f32879ea35523b9842bdbdc0065e13635caada2 (diff)
ovl: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up
If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up, upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem clears it as upon file write). From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should not result in losing security.capability xattr. Hence, before data copy up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after data copy up is complete. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Fixes: 0c2888749363 ("ovl: A new xattr OVL_XATTR_METACOPY for file on upper") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs')
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c28
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h2
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/util.c55
3 files changed, 63 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 48119b23375b..68b3303e4b46 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
{
struct path upperpath, datapath;
int err;
+ char *capability = NULL;
+ ssize_t uninitialized_var(cap_size);
ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
if (WARN_ON(upperpath.dentry == NULL))
@@ -751,15 +753,37 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
if (WARN_ON(datapath.dentry == NULL))
return -EIO;
+ if (c->stat.size) {
+ err = cap_size = ovl_getxattr(upperpath.dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+ &capability, 0);
+ if (err < 0 && err != -ENODATA)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
err = ovl_copy_up_data(&datapath, &upperpath, c->stat.size);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto out_free;
+
+ /*
+ * Writing to upper file will clear security.capability xattr. We
+ * don't want that to happen for normal copy-up operation.
+ */
+ if (capability) {
+ err = ovl_do_setxattr(upperpath.dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+ capability, cap_size, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
err = vfs_removexattr(upperpath.dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto out_free;
ovl_set_upperdata(d_inode(c->dentry));
+out_free:
+ kfree(capability);
+out:
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index 5e45cb3630a0..9c6018287d57 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir);
int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry);
bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry);
char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding);
+ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
+ size_t padding);
static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir(struct dentry *dentry)
{
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index 7c01327b1852..4035e640f402 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -863,28 +863,49 @@ bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
return (oe->numlower > 1);
}
-char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding)
+ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
+ size_t padding)
{
- int res;
- char *s, *next, *buf = NULL;
+ ssize_t res;
+ char *buf = NULL;
- res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT, NULL, 0);
+ res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) {
if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
- return NULL;
+ return -ENODATA;
goto fail;
}
- buf = kzalloc(res + padding + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ if (res != 0) {
+ buf = kzalloc(res + padding, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- if (res == 0)
- goto invalid;
+ res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
+ if (res < 0)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ *value = buf;
+
+ return res;
+
+fail:
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get xattr %s: err=%zi)\n",
+ name, res);
+ kfree(buf);
+ return res;
+}
- res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT, buf, res);
+char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding)
+{
+ int res;
+ char *s, *next, *buf = NULL;
+
+ res = ovl_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT, &buf, padding + 1);
+ if (res == -ENODATA)
+ return NULL;
if (res < 0)
- goto fail;
+ return ERR_PTR(res);
if (res == 0)
goto invalid;
@@ -900,15 +921,9 @@ char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding)
}
return buf;
-
-err_free:
- kfree(buf);
- return ERR_PTR(res);
-fail:
- pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get redirect (%i)\n", res);
- goto err_free;
invalid:
pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid redirect (%s)\n", buf);
res = -EINVAL;
- goto err_free;
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ERR_PTR(res);
}