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authorHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>2018-02-06 15:37:13 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-02-06 18:32:43 -0800
commitd0290bc20d4739b7a900ae37eb5d4cc3be2b393f (patch)
treef5b70cc2b188c70c2b5628fa71b51cc9dbe4dfcd /fs/proc/kcore.c
parent171ef917dfe721b1437b0066f7bc5684d776bba8 (diff)
fs/proc/kcore.c: use probe_kernel_read() instead of memcpy()
Commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks. Copying to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the kern_addr_valid() check passed. A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null" now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore. Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here. Most architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in question. With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before executing the memcpy() also doesn't work. Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer. This also allows to simplify read_kcore(). At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions. While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be completely removed...(?) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/kcore.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/kcore.c18
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
index 4bc85cb8be6a..e8a93bc8285d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
@@ -512,23 +512,15 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
- unsigned long n;
-
/*
* Using bounce buffer to bypass the
* hardened user copy kernel text checks.
*/
- memcpy(buf, (char *) start, tsz);
- n = copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz);
- /*
- * We cannot distinguish between fault on source
- * and fault on destination. When this happens
- * we clear too and hope it will trigger the
- * EFAULT again.
- */
- if (n) {
- if (clear_user(buffer + tsz - n,
- n))
+ if (probe_kernel_read(buf, (void *) start, tsz)) {
+ if (clear_user(buffer, tsz))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else {
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf, tsz))
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {