Merge tag 'locking-kcsan-2020-06-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull the Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) is a dynamic race detector,
  which relies on compile-time instrumentation, and uses a
  watchpoint-based sampling approach to detect races.

  The feature was under development for quite some time and has already
  found legitimate bugs.

  Unfortunately it comes with a limitation, which was only understood
  late in the development cycle:

     It requires an up to date CLANG-11 compiler

  CLANG-11 is not yet released (scheduled for June), but it's the only
  compiler today which handles the kernel requirements and especially
  the annotations of functions to exclude them from KCSAN
  instrumentation correctly.

  These annotations really need to work so that low level entry code and
  especially int3 text poke handling can be completely isolated.

  A detailed discussion of the requirements and compiler issues can be
  found here:

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANpmjNMTsY_8241bS7=XAfqvZHFLrVEkv_uM4aDUWE_kh3Rvbw@mail.gmail.com/

  We came to the conclusion that trying to work around compiler
  limitations and bugs again would end up in a major trainwreck, so
  requiring a working compiler seemed to be the best choice.

  For Continous Integration purposes the compiler restriction is
  manageable and that's where most xxSAN reports come from.

  For a change this limitation might make GCC people actually look at
  their bugs. Some issues with CSAN in GCC are 7 years old and one has
  been 'fixed' 3 years ago with a half baken solution which 'solved' the
  reported issue but not the underlying problem.

  The KCSAN developers also ponder to use a GCC plugin to become
  independent, but that's not something which will show up in a few
  days.

  Blocking KCSAN until wide spread compiler support is available is not
  a really good alternative because the continuous growth of lockless
  optimizations in the kernel demands proper tooling support"

* tag 'locking-kcsan-2020-06-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (76 commits)
  compiler_types.h, kasan: Use __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ instead of CONFIG_KASAN to decide inlining
  compiler.h: Move function attributes to compiler_types.h
  compiler.h: Avoid nested statement expression in data_race()
  compiler.h: Remove data_race() and unnecessary checks from {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()
  kcsan: Update Documentation to change supported compilers
  kcsan: Remove 'noinline' from __no_kcsan_or_inline
  kcsan: Pass option tsan-instrument-read-before-write to Clang
  kcsan: Support distinguishing volatile accesses
  kcsan: Restrict supported compilers
  kcsan: Avoid inserting __tsan_func_entry/exit if possible
  ubsan, kcsan: Don't combine sanitizer with kcov on clang
  objtool, kcsan: Add kcsan_disable_current() and kcsan_enable_current_nowarn()
  kcsan: Add __kcsan_{enable,disable}_current() variants
  checkpatch: Warn about data_race() without comment
  kcsan: Use GFP_ATOMIC under spin lock
  Improve KCSAN documentation a bit
  kcsan: Make reporting aware of KCSAN tests
  kcsan: Fix function matching in report
  kcsan: Change data_race() to no longer require marking racing accesses
  kcsan: Move kcsan_{disable,enable}_current() to kcsan-checks.h
  ...

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index dac1db05bf7e..7bcadca22100 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 #ifndef __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
 #define __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
 
+#include <linux/instrumented.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
-#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
 
 #define uaccess_kernel() segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
 __copy_from_user_inatomic(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	kasan_check_write(to, n);
+	instrument_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 }
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
 __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
-	kasan_check_write(to, n);
+	instrument_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 	check_object_size(to, n, false);
 	return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 }
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
 __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	kasan_check_read(from, n);
+	instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 }
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
 __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
-	kasan_check_read(from, n);
+	instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 	check_object_size(from, n, true);
 	return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 }
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	unsigned long res = n;
 	might_fault();
 	if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
-		kasan_check_write(to, n);
+		instrument_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 		res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 	}
 	if (unlikely(res))
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
 	might_fault();
 	if (access_ok(to, n)) {
-		kasan_check_read(from, n);
+		instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 		n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
 	}
 	return n;