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authorJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>2020-05-29 16:06:59 -0700
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2020-06-01 14:48:32 -0700
commite91de6afa81c10e9f855c5695eb9a53168d96b73 (patch)
treeba666cc88807dd13b946d3531c5e6bb947b55f99 /include/net
parentca2f5f21dbbd5e3a00cd3e97f728aa2ca0b2e011 (diff)
bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types with ktls
KTLS uses a stream parser to collect TLS messages and send them to the upper layer tls receive handler. This ensures the tls receiver has a full TLS header to parse when it is run. However, when a socket has BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT program attached before KTLS is enabled we end up with two stream parsers running on the same socket. The result is both try to run on the same socket. First the KTLS stream parser runs and calls read_sock() which will tcp_read_sock which in turn calls tcp_rcv_skb(). This dequeues the skb from the sk_receive_queue. When this is done KTLS code then data_ready() callback which because we stacked KTLS on top of the bpf stream verdict program has been replaced with sk_psock_start_strp(). This will in turn kick the stream parser again and eventually do the same thing KTLS did above calling into tcp_rcv_skb() and dequeuing a skb from the sk_receive_queue. At this point the data stream is broke. Part of the stream was handled by the KTLS side some other bytes may have been handled by the BPF side. Generally this results in either missing data or more likely a "Bad Message" complaint from the kTLS receive handler as the BPF program steals some bytes meant to be in a TLS header and/or the TLS header length is no longer correct. We've already broke the idealized model where we can stack ULPs in any order with generic callbacks on the TX side to handle this. So in this patch we do the same thing but for RX side. We add a sk_psock_strp_enabled() helper so TLS can learn a BPF verdict program is running and add a tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() helper so BPF side can learn there is a TLS ULP on the socket. Then on BPF side we omit calling our stream parser to avoid breaking the data stream for the KTLS receiver. Then on the KTLS side we call BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT once the KTLS receiver is done with the packet but before it posts the msg to userspace. This gives us symmetry between the TX and RX halfs and IMO makes it usable again. On the TX side we process packets in this order BPF -> TLS -> TCP and on the receive side in the reverse order TCP -> TLS -> BPF. Discovered while testing OpenSSL 3.0 Alpha2.0 release. Fixes: d829e9c4112b5 ("tls: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/159079361946.5745.605854335665044485.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net')
-rw-r--r--include/net/tls.h9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index 3e7b44cae0d9..3212d3c214a9 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -571,6 +571,15 @@ static inline bool tls_sw_has_ctx_tx(const struct sock *sk)
return !!tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
}
+static inline bool tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return false;
+ return !!tls_sw_ctx_rx(ctx);
+}
+
void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
void tls_device_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);