diff options
| author | Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> | 2023-07-18 13:56:07 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | 2023-07-18 14:16:25 -0600 |
| commit | 6adc2272aaaf84f34b652cf77f770c6fcc4b8336 (patch) | |
| tree | e4d3db0f647430b5124976f181dbd15d1630cd45 /io_uring | |
| parent | 8a796565cec3601071cbbd27d6304e202019d014 (diff) | |
io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Since not having the capability merely means that the created io_uring
context will be accounted against the current user's RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
limit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by using
ns_capable_noaudit() instead of capable().
Fixes: 2b188cc1bb85 ("Add io_uring IO interface")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2193317
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718115607.65652-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Diffstat (limited to 'io_uring')
| -rw-r--r-- | io_uring/io_uring.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 7505de2428e0..a9923676d16d 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -3870,7 +3870,7 @@ static __cold int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p, ctx->syscall_iopoll = 1; ctx->compat = in_compat_syscall(); - if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) + if (!ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) ctx->user = get_uid(current_user()); /* |