Merge tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:
 "One of the more voluminous set of changes is for adding the new
  __counted_by annotation[1] to gain run-time bounds checking of
  dynamically sized arrays with UBSan.

   - Add LKDTM test for stuck CPUs (Mark Rutland)

   - Improve LKDTM selftest behavior under UBSan (Ricardo Cañuelo)

   - Refactor more 1-element arrays into flexible arrays (Gustavo A. R.
     Silva)

   - Analyze and replace strlcpy and strncpy uses (Justin Stitt, Azeem
     Shaikh)

   - Convert group_info.usage to refcount_t (Elena Reshetova)

   - Add __counted_by annotations (Kees Cook, Gustavo A. R. Silva)

   - Add Kconfig fragment for basic hardening options (Kees Cook, Lukas
     Bulwahn)

   - Fix randstruct GCC plugin performance mode to stay in groups (Kees
     Cook)

   - Fix strtomem() compile-time check for small sources (Kees Cook)"

* tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (56 commits)
  hwmon: (acpi_power_meter) replace open-coded kmemdup_nul
  reset: Annotate struct reset_control_array with __counted_by
  kexec: Annotate struct crash_mem with __counted_by
  virtio_console: Annotate struct port_buffer with __counted_by
  ima: Add __counted_by for struct modsig and use struct_size()
  MAINTAINERS: Include stackleak paths in hardening entry
  string: Adjust strtomem() logic to allow for smaller sources
  hardening: x86: drop reference to removed config AMD_IOMMU_V2
  randstruct: Fix gcc-plugin performance mode to stay in group
  mailbox: zynqmp: Annotate struct zynqmp_ipi_pdata with __counted_by
  drivers: thermal: tsens: Annotate struct tsens_priv with __counted_by
  irqchip/imx-intmux: Annotate struct intmux_data with __counted_by
  KVM: Annotate struct kvm_irq_routing_table with __counted_by
  virt: acrn: Annotate struct vm_memory_region_batch with __counted_by
  hwmon: Annotate struct gsc_hwmon_platform_data with __counted_by
  sparc: Annotate struct cpuinfo_tree with __counted_by
  isdn: kcapi: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy_pad
  isdn: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
  NFS/flexfiles: Annotate struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment with __counted_by
  nfs41: Annotate struct nfs4_file_layout_dsaddr with __counted_by
  ...

1 files changed, 98 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..95a400f042b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# Help: Basic kernel hardening options
+#
+# These are considered the basic kernel hardening, self-protection, and
+# attack surface reduction options. They are expected to have low (or
+# no) performance impact on most workloads, and have a reasonable level
+# of legacy API removals.
+
+# Make sure reporting of various hardening actions is possible.
+CONFIG_BUG=y
+
+# Basic kernel memory permission enforcement.
+CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
+CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
+CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
+
+# Kernel image and memory ASLR.
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y
+
+# Randomize allocator freelists, harden metadata.
+CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
+CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
+CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR=y
+CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES=y
+
+# Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry.
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y
+
+# Basic stack frame overflow protection.
+CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
+CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
+
+# Basic buffer length bounds checking.
+CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
+CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
+
+# Basic array index bounds checking.
+CONFIG_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
+CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y
+
+# Linked list integrity checking.
+CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED=y
+
+# Initialize all heap variables to zero on allocation.
+CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
+
+# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
+CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+
+# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
+# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
+CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION=y
+
+# Disable DMA between EFI hand-off and the kernel's IOMMU setup.
+CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA=y
+
+# Force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale
+# data content.
+CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT=y
+
+# Do not allow direct physical memory access to non-device memory.
+CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
+CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
+
+# Provide userspace with seccomp BPF API for syscall attack surface reduction.
+CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
+CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
+
+# Provides some protections against SYN flooding.
+CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y
+
+# Attack surface reduction: do not autoload TTY line disciplines.
+# CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace brk ASLR.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+
+# Dangerous; exposes kernel text image layout.
+# CONFIG_PROC_KCORE is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace VDSO ASLR.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO is not set
+
+# Attack surface reduction: Use the modern PTY interface (devpts) only.
+# CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS is not set
+
+# Attack surface reduction: Use only modesetting video drivers.
+# CONFIG_DRM_LEGACY is not set