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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-11-21 10:24:05 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-11-21 10:24:05 -0800
commitea0ab64306355432746bafda0364fb2d593bc9e3 (patch)
treeeb3dbdce84224e804ef8b680a9392d822d94ff44 /kernel
parent27bba9c532a8d21050b94224ffd310ad0058c353 (diff)
parent4c222f31fb1db4d590503a181a6268ced9252379 (diff)
Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp fixes from Kees Cook: "This gets the seccomp selftests running again on powerpc and sh, and fixes an audit reporting oversight noticed in both seccomp and ptrace. - Fix typos in seccomp selftests on powerpc and sh (Kees Cook) - Fix PF_SUPERPRIV audit marking in seccomp and ptrace (Mickaël Salaün)" * tag 'seccomp-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: selftests/seccomp: sh: Fix register names selftests/seccomp: powerpc: Fix typo in macro variable name seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c16
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c5
2 files changed, 7 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 43d6179508d6..79de1294f8eb 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,17 +264,11 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
-static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
- unsigned int mode)
+static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
{
- int ret;
-
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
- ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
- else
- ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
- return ret == 0;
+ return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
}
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
@@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -345,7 +339,7 @@ ok:
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 8ad7a293255a..53a7d1512dd7 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
* behavior of privileged children.
*/
if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
- security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
- CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+ !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */