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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-12-05 16:30:30 -0800
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-12-05 16:30:30 -0800
commite37d05a538a6656e108f7704ad66e1ccc13d6f68 (patch)
tree139001db1e7f6bc6a19c6766ee3285d9a8d8de0b /kernel
parent22f6bbb7bcfcef0b373b0502a7ff390275c575dd (diff)
parenta92a72a24d48080f6c49bb514c082fbb1e5bf8fc (diff)
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Alexei Starovoitov says: ==================== pull-request: bpf 2018-12-05 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree. The main changes are: 1) fix bpf uapi pointers for 32-bit architectures, from Daniel. 2) improve verifer ability to handle progs with a lot of branches, from Alexei. 3) strict btf checks, from Yonghong. 4) bpf_sk_lookup api cleanup, from Joe. 5) other misc fixes ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/btf.c82
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c103
2 files changed, 171 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index ee4c82667d65..4da543d6bea2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/types.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -426,6 +427,30 @@ static bool btf_name_offset_valid(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
offset < btf->hdr.str_len;
}
+/* Only C-style identifier is permitted. This can be relaxed if
+ * necessary.
+ */
+static bool btf_name_valid_identifier(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
+{
+ /* offset must be valid */
+ const char *src = &btf->strings[offset];
+ const char *src_limit;
+
+ if (!isalpha(*src) && *src != '_')
+ return false;
+
+ /* set a limit on identifier length */
+ src_limit = src + KSYM_NAME_LEN;
+ src++;
+ while (*src && src < src_limit) {
+ if (!isalnum(*src) && *src != '_')
+ return false;
+ src++;
+ }
+
+ return !*src;
+}
+
static const char *btf_name_by_offset(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
{
if (!offset)
@@ -1143,6 +1168,22 @@ static int btf_ref_type_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* typedef type must have a valid name, and other ref types,
+ * volatile, const, restrict, should have a null name.
+ */
+ if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) == BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF) {
+ if (!t->name_off ||
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (t->name_off) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
return 0;
@@ -1300,6 +1341,13 @@ static s32 btf_fwd_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* fwd type must have a valid name */
+ if (!t->name_off ||
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
return 0;
@@ -1356,6 +1404,12 @@ static s32 btf_array_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* array type should not have a name */
+ if (t->name_off) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (btf_type_vlen(t)) {
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "vlen != 0");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1532,6 +1586,13 @@ static s32 btf_struct_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* struct type either no name or a valid one */
+ if (t->name_off &&
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
last_offset = 0;
@@ -1543,6 +1604,12 @@ static s32 btf_struct_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* struct member either no name or a valid one */
+ if (member->name_off &&
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(btf, member->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_member(env, t, member, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
/* A member cannot be in type void */
if (!member->type || !BTF_TYPE_ID_VALID(member->type)) {
btf_verifier_log_member(env, t, member,
@@ -1730,6 +1797,13 @@ static s32 btf_enum_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* enum type either no name or a valid one */
+ if (t->name_off &&
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < nr_enums; i++) {
@@ -1739,6 +1813,14 @@ static s32 btf_enum_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* enum member must have a valid name */
+ if (!enums[i].name_off ||
+ !btf_name_valid_identifier(btf, enums[i].name_off)) {
+ btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+
btf_verifier_log(env, "\t%s val=%d\n",
btf_name_by_offset(btf, enums[i].name_off),
enums[i].val);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 6dd419550aba..fc760d00a38c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
+#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \
@@ -3751,6 +3752,79 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
}
}
+/* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;"
+ * and return:
+ * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed
+ * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn
+ * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value range [0,10]
+ */
+static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode)
+{
+ if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg))
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case BPF_JEQ:
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
+ return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
+ break;
+ case BPF_JNE:
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
+ return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
+ break;
+ case BPF_JGT:
+ if (reg->umin_value > val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umax_value <= val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSGT:
+ if (reg->smin_value > (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smax_value < (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JLT:
+ if (reg->umax_value < val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umin_value >= val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSLT:
+ if (reg->smax_value < (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smin_value >= (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JGE:
+ if (reg->umin_value >= val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umax_value < val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSGE:
+ if (reg->smin_value >= (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smax_value < (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JLE:
+ if (reg->umax_value <= val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->umin_value > val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSLE:
+ if (reg->smax_value <= (s64)val)
+ return 1;
+ else if (reg->smin_value > (s64)val)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
* variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
* simply doing a BPF_K check.
@@ -4152,21 +4226,15 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
- /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
- if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
- (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
- dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
- tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) {
- if ((opcode == BPF_JEQ && dst_reg->var_off.value == insn->imm) ||
- (opcode == BPF_JNE && dst_reg->var_off.value != insn->imm)) {
- /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
- * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
- */
+ if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ int pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
+
+ if (pred == 1) {
+ /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
- } else {
- /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
- * only follow fall-through branch, since
+ } else if (pred == 0) {
+ /* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
*/
return 0;
@@ -4980,7 +5048,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
- int i, j, err;
+ int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
if (!sl)
@@ -5007,8 +5075,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
return 1;
}
sl = sl->next;
+ states_cnt++;
}
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
+ return 0;
+
/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
* technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
* but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
@@ -5148,6 +5220,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();