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authorUdip Pant <udippant@fb.com>2020-08-25 16:20:00 -0700
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2020-08-26 12:47:56 -0700
commit7e40781cc8b767dd6530910ae12d75978d7d68e1 (patch)
tree6317f0b454db58419bd7a7205a853853493c4b83 /kernel
parent7100ff7c62682c2332300ffde8706578e1098e13 (diff)
bpf: verifier: Use target program's type for access verifications
This patch adds changes in verifier to make decisions such as granting of read / write access or enforcement of return code status based on the program type of the target program while using dynamic program extension (of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT). The BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT type can be used to extend types such as XDP, SKB and others. Since the BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program type on itself is just a placeholder for those, we need this extended check for those extended programs to actually work with proper access, while using this option. Specifically, it introduces following changes: - may_access_direct_pkt_data: allow access to packet data based on the target prog - check_return_code: enforce return code based on the target prog (currently, this check is skipped for EXT program) - check_ld_abs: check for 'may_access_skb' based on the target prog - check_map_prog_compatibility: enforce the map compatibility check based on the target prog - may_update_sockmap: allow sockmap update based on the target prog Some other occurrences of prog->type is left as it without replacing with the 'resolved' type: - do_check_common() and check_attach_btf_id(): already have specific logic to handle the EXT prog type - jit_subprogs() and bpf_check(): Not changed for jit compilation or while inferring env->ops Next few patches in this series include selftests for some of these cases. Signed-off-by: Udip Pant <udippant@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825232003.2877030-2-udippant@fb.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c32
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 7e5908b83ec7..8a097a85d01b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2625,11 +2625,19 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
+static enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ return prog->aux->linked_prog ? prog->aux->linked_prog->type
+ : prog->type;
+}
+
static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
enum bpf_access_type t)
{
- switch (env->prog->type) {
+ enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
+
+ switch (prog_type) {
/* Program types only with direct read access go here! */
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
@@ -4186,7 +4194,7 @@ err_type:
static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
{
enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type;
- enum bpf_prog_type type = env->prog->type;
+ enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem)
return false;
@@ -7376,7 +7384,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
int i, err;
- if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
+ if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) {
verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -7464,11 +7472,12 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
+ enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
int err;
/* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
- if ((env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
- env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) &&
+ if ((prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
+ prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) &&
!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
return 0;
@@ -7487,7 +7496,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EACCES;
}
- switch (env->prog->type) {
+ switch (prog_type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG ||
@@ -9243,6 +9252,7 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
+ enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
/*
* Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps.
*
@@ -9260,8 +9270,8 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of
* the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced.
*/
- if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog->type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) {
- if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
+ if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) {
+ if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -9273,8 +9283,8 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n");
}
- if ((is_tracing_prog_type(prog->type) ||
- prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) &&
+ if ((is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) ||
+ prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) &&
map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -9986,7 +9996,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
- } else if (env->prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
+ } else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n");
return -EINVAL;
}