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authorHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>2014-07-28 14:01:38 +0200
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2014-07-30 13:55:27 -0700
commit4ada97abe937cdb3fc029a871d5b0f21aa661a60 (patch)
tree74cd1b18f41a06e2c86e96565cd887206a28c87e /lib/random32.c
parentf139c74a8df071217dcd63f3ef06ae7be7071c4d (diff)
random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall
Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom(): Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom() subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase. Here, the system might not have enough entropy available for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver. That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running. Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong randomness. Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random source again. A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users access a possibly better early seeded prandom. This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(), preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it would be as good as our original early seeding function prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is entropy preserving. Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/random32.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/random32.c49
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index fa5da61ce7ad..c9b6bf3afe0c 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void);
+#else
+static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
+{
+}
#endif
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
@@ -53,8 +57,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
*/
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
{
-#define TAUSWORTHE(s,a,b,c,d) ((s&c)<<d) ^ (((s <<a) ^ s)>>b)
-
+#define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b)
state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6U, 13U, 4294967294U, 18U);
state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2U, 27U, 4294967288U, 2U);
state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13U, 21U, 4294967280U, 7U);
@@ -147,21 +150,25 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state)
prandom_u32_state(state);
}
-static void prandom_seed_very_weak(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed)
+static u32 __extract_hwseed(void)
{
- /* Note: This sort of seeding is ONLY used in test cases and
- * during boot at the time from core_initcall until late_initcall
- * as we don't have a stronger entropy source available yet.
- * After late_initcall, we reseed entire state, we have to (!),
- * otherwise an attacker just needs to search 32 bit space to
- * probe for our internal 128 bit state if he knows a couple
- * of prandom32 outputs!
- */
-#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
- state->s1 = __seed(LCG(seed), 2U);
- state->s2 = __seed(LCG(state->s1), 8U);
- state->s3 = __seed(LCG(state->s2), 16U);
- state->s4 = __seed(LCG(state->s3), 128U);
+ u32 val = 0;
+
+ (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) ||
+ arch_get_random_int(&val));
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed,
+ bool mix_with_hwseed)
+{
+#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */
+#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0)
+ state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U);
+ state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U);
+ state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U);
+ state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U);
}
/**
@@ -194,14 +201,13 @@ static int __init prandom_init(void)
{
int i;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
prandom_state_selftest();
-#endif
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state,i);
+ u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy();
- prandom_seed_very_weak(state, (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy());
+ prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true);
prandom_warmup(state);
}
@@ -210,6 +216,7 @@ static int __init prandom_init(void)
core_initcall(prandom_init);
static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
+
static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
@@ -419,7 +426,7 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test1); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
- prandom_seed_very_weak(&state, test1[i].seed);
+ prandom_seed_early(&state, test1[i].seed, false);
prandom_warmup(&state);
if (test1[i].result != prandom_u32_state(&state))
@@ -434,7 +441,7 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test2); i++) {
struct rnd_state state;
- prandom_seed_very_weak(&state, test2[i].seed);
+ prandom_seed_early(&state, test2[i].seed, false);
prandom_warmup(&state);
for (j = 0; j < test2[i].iteration - 1; j++)