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authorhuangshaobo <huangshaobo6@huawei.com>2022-05-09 18:20:51 -0700
committerAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>2022-05-13 07:20:06 -0700
commit3c81b3bb0a33e2b555edb8d7eb99a7ae4f17d8bb (patch)
tree355df5684528463a9b24b1f8d9c3c7c460bd43d1 /mm/kfence
parent4b25f030ae69ba710eff587cabb4c57cb7e7a8a1 (diff)
kfence: enable check kfence canary on panic via boot param
Out-of-bounds accesses that aren't caught by a guard page will result in corruption of canary memory. In pathological cases, where an object has certain alignment requirements, an out-of-bounds access might never be caught by the guard page. Such corruptions, however, are only detected on kfree() normally. If the bug causes the kernel to panic before kfree(), KFENCE has no opportunity to report the issue. Such corruptions may also indicate failing memory or other faults. To provide some more information in such cases, add the option to check canary bytes on panic. This might help narrow the search for the panic cause; but, due to only having the allocation stack trace, such reports are difficult to use to diagnose an issue alone. In most cases, such reports are inactionable, and is therefore an opt-in feature (disabled by default). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add __read_mostly, per Marco] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220425022456.44300-1-huangshaobo6@huawei.com Signed-off-by: huangshaobo <huangshaobo6@huawei.com> Suggested-by: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com> Cc: Wangbing <wangbing6@huawei.com> Cc: Jubin Zhong <zhongjubin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/kfence')
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/core.c34
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 9b2b5f56f4ae..6e69986c3f0d 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
@@ -99,6 +101,10 @@ module_param_named(skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong, 0644)
static bool kfence_deferrable __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE);
module_param_named(deferrable, kfence_deferrable, bool, 0444);
+/* If true, check all canary bytes on panic. */
+static bool kfence_check_on_panic __read_mostly;
+module_param_named(check_on_panic, kfence_check_on_panic, bool, 0444);
+
/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */
char *__kfence_pool __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */
@@ -727,6 +733,31 @@ static int __init kfence_debugfs_init(void)
late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init);
+/* === Panic Notifier ====================================================== */
+
+static void kfence_check_all_canary(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+ if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED)
+ for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte);
+ }
+}
+
+static int kfence_check_canary_callback(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long reason, void *arg)
+{
+ kfence_check_all_canary();
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block kfence_check_canary_notifier = {
+ .notifier_call = kfence_check_canary_callback,
+};
+
/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */
static struct delayed_work kfence_timer;
@@ -804,6 +835,9 @@ static void kfence_init_enable(void)
else
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate);
+ if (kfence_check_on_panic)
+ atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &kfence_check_canary_notifier);
+
WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0);