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authorChriz Chow <cmcvista@gmail.com>2018-04-20 15:46:24 +0800
committerMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2018-05-18 06:37:51 +0200
commitee6493462f74013c6f365429401b716500aff838 (patch)
tree29fed836bb393f20e99c2e3c9f3876db58602144 /net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
parent2cc6d0794cbab470b2d82d5a7547c865fd61e0f3 (diff)
Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow for large advertisement data
There are some controllers sending out advertising data with illegal length value which is longer than HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH, causing the buffer last_adv_data overflows. To avoid these controllers from overflowing the buffer, we do not process the advertisement data if its length is incorrect. Signed-off-by: Chriz Chow <chriz.chow@aminocom.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/hci_event.c')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_event.c12
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 139707cd9d35..235b5aaab23d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -4942,10 +4942,14 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;
s8 rssi;
- rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
- process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
- ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
- ev->data, ev->length);
+ if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
+ rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
+ process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
+ ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
+ ev->data, ev->length);
+ } else {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Dropping invalid advertising data");
+ }
ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
}