diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-06-30 15:51:09 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-06-30 15:51:09 -0700 |
commit | dbe69e43372212527abf48609aba7fc39a6daa27 (patch) | |
tree | 96cfafdf70f5325ceeac1054daf7deca339c9730 /net/bluetooth/smp.c | |
parent | a6eaf3850cb171c328a8b0db6d3c79286a1eba9d (diff) | |
parent | b6df00789e2831fff7a2c65aa7164b2a4dcbe599 (diff) |
Merge tag 'net-next-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- BPF:
- add syscall program type and libbpf support for generating
instructions and bindings for in-kernel BPF loaders (BPF loaders
for BPF), this is a stepping stone for signed BPF programs
- infrastructure to migrate TCP child sockets from one listener to
another in the same reuseport group/map to improve flexibility
of service hand-off/restart
- add broadcast support to XDP redirect
- allow bypass of the lockless qdisc to improving performance (for
pktgen: +23% with one thread, +44% with 2 threads)
- add a simpler version of "DO_ONCE()" which does not require jump
labels, intended for slow-path usage
- virtio/vsock: introduce SOCK_SEQPACKET support
- add getsocketopt to retrieve netns cookie
- ip: treat lowest address of a IPv4 subnet as ordinary unicast
address allowing reclaiming of precious IPv4 addresses
- ipv6: use prandom_u32() for ID generation
- ip: add support for more flexible field selection for hashing
across multi-path routes (w/ offload to mlxsw)
- icmp: add support for extended RFC 8335 PROBE (ping)
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT46 behavior
- mptcp:
- DSS checksum support (RFC 8684) to detect middlebox meddling
- support Connection-time 'C' flag
- time stamping support
- sctp: packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (RFC 8899)
- xfrm: speed up state addition with seq set
- WiFi:
- hidden AP discovery on 6 GHz and other HE 6 GHz improvements
- aggregation handling improvements for some drivers
- minstrel improvements for no-ack frames
- deferred rate control for TXQs to improve reaction times
- switch from round robin to virtual time-based airtime scheduler
- add trace points:
- tcp checksum errors
- openvswitch - action execution, upcalls
- socket errors via sk_error_report
Device APIs:
- devlink: add rate API for hierarchical control of max egress rate
of virtual devices (VFs, SFs etc.)
- don't require RCU read lock to be held around BPF hooks in NAPI
context
- page_pool: generic buffer recycling
New hardware/drivers:
- mobile:
- iosm: PCIe Driver for Intel M.2 Modem
- support for Qualcomm MSM8998 (ipa)
- WiFi: Qualcomm QCN9074 and WCN6855 PCI devices
- sparx5: Microchip SparX-5 family of Enterprise Ethernet switches
- Mellanox BlueField Gigabit Ethernet (control NIC of the DPU)
- NXP SJA1110 Automotive Ethernet 10-port switch
- Qualcomm QCA8327 switch support (qca8k)
- Mikrotik 10/25G NIC (atl1c)
Driver changes:
- ACPI support for some MDIO, MAC and PHY devices from Marvell and
NXP (our first foray into MAC/PHY description via ACPI)
- HW timestamping (PTP) support: bnxt_en, ice, sja1105, hns3, tja11xx
- Mellanox/Nvidia NIC (mlx5)
- NIC VF offload of L2 bridging
- support IRQ distribution to Sub-functions
- Marvell (prestera):
- add flower and match all
- devlink trap
- link aggregation
- Netronome (nfp): connection tracking offload
- Intel 1GE (igc): add AF_XDP support
- Marvell DPU (octeontx2): ingress ratelimit offload
- Google vNIC (gve): new ring/descriptor format support
- Qualcomm mobile (rmnet & ipa): inline checksum offload support
- MediaTek WiFi (mt76)
- mt7915 MSI support
- mt7915 Tx status reporting
- mt7915 thermal sensors support
- mt7921 decapsulation offload
- mt7921 enable runtime pm and deep sleep
- Realtek WiFi (rtw88)
- beacon filter support
- Tx antenna path diversity support
- firmware crash information via devcoredump
- Qualcomm WiFi (wcn36xx)
- Wake-on-WLAN support with magic packets and GTK rekeying
- Micrel PHY (ksz886x/ksz8081): add cable test support"
* tag 'net-next-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2168 commits)
tcp: change ICSK_CA_PRIV_SIZE definition
tcp_yeah: check struct yeah size at compile time
gve: DQO: Fix off by one in gve_rx_dqo()
stmmac: intel: set PCI_D3hot in suspend
stmmac: intel: Enable PHY WOL option in EHL
net: stmmac: option to enable PHY WOL with PMT enabled
net: say "local" instead of "static" addresses in ndo_dflt_fdb_{add,del}
net: use netdev_info in ndo_dflt_fdb_{add,del}
ptp: Set lookup cookie when creating a PTP PPS source.
net: sock: add trace for socket errors
net: sock: introduce sk_error_report
net: dsa: replay the local bridge FDB entries pointing to the bridge dev too
net: dsa: ensure during dsa_fdb_offload_notify that dev_hold and dev_put are on the same dev
net: dsa: include fdb entries pointing to bridge in the host fdb list
net: dsa: include bridge addresses which are local in the host fdb list
net: dsa: sync static FDB entries on foreign interfaces to hardware
net: dsa: install the host MDB and FDB entries in the master's RX filter
net: dsa: reference count the FDB addresses at the cross-chip notifier level
net: dsa: introduce a separate cross-chip notifier type for host FDBs
net: dsa: reference count the MDB entries at the cross-chip notifier level
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 84 |
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 7dd51da73845..11f853d0500f 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data) /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want - * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys + * accidentally in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions. */ #ifdef DEBUG @@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ struct smp_chan { u8 id_addr_type; u8 irk[16]; struct smp_csrk *csrk; - struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; + struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk; struct smp_ltk *ltk; - struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; + struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk; struct smp_irk *remote_irk; u8 *link_key; unsigned long flags; @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) return err; /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that - * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key. + * we didn't accidentally generate a debug key. */ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) break; @@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete); kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk); - kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk); + kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk); kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); @@ -776,9 +776,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); } - if (smp->slave_ltk) { - list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); - kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); + if (smp->responder_ltk) { + list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu); } if (smp->remote_irk) { @@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); - bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%u lcl:%u rem:%u", auth, local_io, remote_io); /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming @@ -909,8 +909,8 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; } - /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master - * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. + /* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator + * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey. */ if (smp->method == OVERLAP) { if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) @@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); passkey %= 1000000; put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); - bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", passkey); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", passkey); set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); } @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) int ret; bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, - conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder"); ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, @@ -1021,8 +1021,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) else auth = 0; - /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the - * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master + /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the + * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator * STK never needs to be stored). */ hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, @@ -1077,10 +1077,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); } - if (smp->slave_csrk) { - smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); + if (smp->responder_csrk) { + smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent); } if (smp->ltk) { @@ -1089,10 +1089,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); } - if (smp->slave_ltk) { - smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); + if (smp->responder_ltk) { + smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent); } if (smp->link_key) { @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; - struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; + struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident; struct smp_ltk *ltk; u8 authenticated; __le16 ediv; @@ -1293,14 +1293,15 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, - SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, + SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); - smp->slave_ltk = ltk; + smp->responder_ltk = ltk; ident.ediv = ediv; ident.rand = rand; - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident), + &ident); *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; } @@ -1343,7 +1344,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); } - smp->slave_csrk = csrk; + smp->responder_csrk = csrk; smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); @@ -1654,7 +1655,7 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); - bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", value); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", value); put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); fallthrough; case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: @@ -1902,7 +1903,7 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that - * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key. + * we didn't accidentally generate a debug key. */ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) break; @@ -2048,7 +2049,7 @@ static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp) struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; u8 auth; - /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */ + /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */ if (hcon->out) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; @@ -2084,7 +2085,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; - bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, + hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder"); if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2251,7 +2253,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; - /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ + /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); return true; @@ -2467,7 +2469,7 @@ int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */ smp->ltk = NULL; - smp->slave_ltk = NULL; + smp->responder_ltk = NULL; smp->remote_irk = NULL; if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) @@ -2503,7 +2505,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; } - SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); + SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); @@ -2512,9 +2514,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; + struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data; struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; @@ -2913,7 +2915,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } - /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */ + /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */ sc_dhkey_check(smp); } @@ -3000,8 +3002,8 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); break; - case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: - reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); + case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT: + reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb); break; case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: @@ -3081,7 +3083,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) return; - /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */ + /* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */ if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) return; |