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authorHaishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com>2017-09-27 11:35:42 +0800
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-10-01 17:55:54 -0700
commit437138485656c41e32b8c63c0987cfa0348be0e6 (patch)
tree942ae784a68f7d351f62fd3ac48c1330d629ce31 /net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
parentdd000598a39b6937fcefdf143720ec9fb5250e72 (diff)
ipv4: Namespaceify tcp_fastopen_key knob
Different namespace application might require different tcp_fastopen_key independently of the host. David Miller pointed out there is a leak without releasing the context of tcp_fastopen_key during netns teardown. So add the release action in exit_batch path. Tested: 1. Container namespace: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key: 2817fff2-f803cf97-eadfd1f3-78c0992b cookie key in tcp syn packets: Fast Open Cookie Kind: TCP Fast Open Cookie (34) Length: 10 Fast Open Cookie: 1e5dd82a8c492ca9 2. Host: # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key: 107d7c5f-68eb2ac7-02fb06e6-ed341702 cookie key in tcp syn packets: Fast Open Cookie Kind: TCP Fast Open Cookie (34) Length: 10 Fast Open Cookie: e213c02bf0afbc8a Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c64
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index 8c8f0f0af59d..4eae44ac3cb0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -9,13 +9,18 @@
#include <net/inetpeer.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
-struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
-
-void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(void)
+void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(struct net *net)
{
- static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
+ struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctxt;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctxt = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx);
+ if (ctxt) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
/* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
* atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
@@ -23,8 +28,8 @@ void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(void)
* All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
* for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
*/
- if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)))
- tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
+ get_random_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
+ tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(net, key, sizeof(key));
}
static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
@@ -35,7 +40,22 @@ static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
kfree(ctx);
}
-int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(void *key, unsigned int len)
+void tcp_fastopen_ctx_destroy(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctxt;
+
+ spin_lock(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
+
+ ctxt = rcu_dereference_protected(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx,
+ lockdep_is_held(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock));
+ rcu_assign_pointer(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx, NULL);
+ spin_unlock(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
+
+ if (ctxt)
+ call_rcu(&ctxt->rcu, tcp_fastopen_ctx_free);
+}
+
+int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(struct net *net, void *key, unsigned int len)
{
int err;
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx, *octx;
@@ -59,26 +79,27 @@ error: kfree(ctx);
}
memcpy(ctx->key, key, len);
- spin_lock(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
+ spin_lock(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
- octx = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_fastopen_ctx,
- lockdep_is_held(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock));
- rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_fastopen_ctx, ctx);
- spin_unlock(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
+ octx = rcu_dereference_protected(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx,
+ lockdep_is_held(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock));
+ rcu_assign_pointer(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx, ctx);
+ spin_unlock(&net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
if (octx)
call_rcu(&octx->rcu, tcp_fastopen_ctx_free);
return err;
}
-static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(const void *path,
+static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct net *net,
+ const void *path,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
{
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
bool ok = false;
rcu_read_lock();
- ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
+ ctx = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_fastopen_ctx);
if (ctx) {
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, foc->val, path);
foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE;
@@ -94,7 +115,8 @@ static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(const void *path,
*
* XXX (TFO) - refactor when TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE != AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
*/
-static bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct request_sock *req,
+static bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct net *net,
+ struct request_sock *req,
struct sk_buff *syn,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
{
@@ -102,7 +124,7 @@ static bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct request_sock *req,
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(syn);
__be32 path[4] = { iph->saddr, iph->daddr, 0, 0 };
- return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(path, foc);
+ return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(net, path, foc);
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -110,13 +132,13 @@ static bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct request_sock *req,
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(syn);
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie tmp;
- if (__tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(&ip6h->saddr, &tmp)) {
+ if (__tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(net, &ip6h->saddr, &tmp)) {
struct in6_addr *buf = &tmp.addr;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
buf->s6_addr32[i] ^= ip6h->daddr.s6_addr32[i];
- return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(buf, foc);
+ return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(net, buf, foc);
}
}
#endif
@@ -296,7 +318,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
goto fastopen;
if (foc->len >= 0 && /* Client presents or requests a cookie */
- tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(req, skb, &valid_foc) &&
+ tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(sock_net(sk), req, skb, &valid_foc) &&
foc->len == TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE &&
foc->len == valid_foc.len &&
!memcmp(foc->val, valid_foc.val, foc->len)) {