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authorWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>2017-11-21 10:22:25 -0500
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-11-24 01:37:35 +0900
commit0c19f846d582af919db66a5914a0189f9f92c936 (patch)
tree327b6d3dad4895621dd6fb712f7b59bbf7b922dd /net/ipv6
parent9e77d7a5549dc4d4999a60676373ab3fd1dae4db (diff)
net: accept UFO datagrams from tuntap and packet
Tuntap and similar devices can inject GSO packets. Accept type VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP, even though not generating UFO natively. Processes are expected to use feature negotiation such as TUNSETOFFLOAD to detect supported offload types and refrain from injecting other packets. This process breaks down with live migration: guest kernels do not renegotiate flags, so destination hosts need to expose all features that the source host does. Partially revert the UFO removal from 182e0b6b5846~1..d9d30adf5677. This patch introduces nearly(*) no new code to simplify verification. It brings back verbatim tuntap UFO negotiation, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP insertion and software UFO segmentation. It does not reinstate protocol stack support, hardware offload (NETIF_F_UFO), SKB_GSO_UDP tunneling in SKB_GSO_SOFTWARE or reception of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP packets in tuntap. To support SKB_GSO_UDP reappearing in the stack, also reinstate logic in act_csum and openvswitch. Achieve equivalence with v4.13 HEAD by squashing in commit 939912216fa8 ("net: skb_needs_check() removes CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY check for tx.") and reverting commit 8d63bee643f1 ("net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFO"). (*) To avoid having to bring back skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id, ipv6_proxy_select_ident is changed to return a __be32 and this is assigned directly to the frag_hdr. Also, SKB_GSO_UDP is inserted at the end of the enum to minimize code churn. Tested Booted a v4.13 guest kernel with QEMU. On a host kernel before this patch `ethtool -k eth0` shows UFO disabled. After the patch, it is enabled, same as on a v4.13 host kernel. A UFO packet sent from the guest appears on the tap device: host: nc -l -p -u 8000 & tcpdump -n -i tap0 guest: dd if=/dev/zero of=payload.txt bs=1 count=2000 nc -u 192.16.1.1 8000 < payload.txt Direct tap to tap transmission of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP succeeds, packets arriving fragmented: ./with_tap_pair.sh ./tap_send_ufo tap0 tap1 (from https://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tree/master/tests) Changes v1 -> v2 - simplified set_offload change (review comment) - documented test procedure Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CAF=yD-LuUeDuL9YWPJD9ykOZ0QCjNeznPDr6whqZ9NGMNF12Mw@mail.gmail.com> Fixes: fb652fdfe837 ("macvlan/macvtap: Remove NETIF_F_UFO advertisement.") Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/output_core.c31
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/udp_offload.c85
2 files changed, 113 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/output_core.c b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
index 4a7e5ffa5108..4fe7c90962dd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
@@ -31,6 +31,37 @@ static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,
return id;
}
+/* This function exists only for tap drivers that must support broken
+ * clients requesting UFO without specifying an IPv6 fragment ID.
+ *
+ * This is similar to ipv6_select_ident() but we use an independent hash
+ * seed to limit information leakage.
+ *
+ * The network header must be set before calling this.
+ */
+__be32 ipv6_proxy_select_ident(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ static u32 ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
+ struct in6_addr buf[2];
+ struct in6_addr *addrs;
+ u32 id;
+
+ addrs = skb_header_pointer(skb,
+ skb_network_offset(skb) +
+ offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, saddr),
+ sizeof(buf), buf);
+ if (!addrs)
+ return 0;
+
+ net_get_random_once(&ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd,
+ sizeof(ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd));
+
+ id = __ipv6_select_ident(net, ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd,
+ &addrs[1], &addrs[0]);
+ return htonl(id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv6_proxy_select_ident);
+
__be32 ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *daddr,
const struct in6_addr *saddr)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
index 455fd4e39333..a0f89ad76f9d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c
@@ -17,15 +17,94 @@
#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
#include "ip6_offload.h"
-static struct sk_buff *udp6_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
- netdev_features_t features)
+static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ unsigned int mss;
+ unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
+ struct frag_hdr *fptr;
+ u8 *packet_start, *prevhdr;
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
+ __wsum csum;
+ int tnl_hlen;
+ int err;
+
+ mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
+ goto out;
if (skb->encapsulation && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
(SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL|SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM))
segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features, true);
+ else {
+ const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
+ struct udphdr *uh;
+
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
+ * do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
+ */
+
+ uh = udp_hdr(skb);
+ ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+
+ uh->check = 0;
+ csum = skb_checksum(skb, 0, skb->len, 0);
+ uh->check = udp_v6_check(skb->len, &ipv6h->saddr,
+ &ipv6h->daddr, csum);
+ if (uh->check == 0)
+ uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
+
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
+
+ /* If there is no outer header we can fake a checksum offload
+ * due to the fact that we have already done the checksum in
+ * software prior to segmenting the frame.
+ */
+ if (!skb->encap_hdr_csum)
+ features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
+
+ /* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
+ tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
+ if (skb->mac_header < (tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz)) {
+ if (gso_pskb_expand_head(skb, tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
+ * bytes to insert fragment header.
+ */
+ err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ unfrag_ip6hlen = err;
+ nexthdr = *prevhdr;
+ *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
+ unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) +
+ unfrag_ip6hlen + tnl_hlen;
+ packet_start = (u8 *) skb->head + SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset;
+ memmove(packet_start-frag_hdr_sz, packet_start, unfrag_len);
+
+ SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset -= frag_hdr_sz;
+ skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
+ skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
+
+ fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
+ fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
+ fptr->reserved = 0;
+ fptr->identification = ipv6_proxy_select_ident(dev_net(skb->dev), skb);
+
+ /* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
+ * fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
+ */
+ segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
+ }
+out:
return segs;
}
@@ -75,7 +154,7 @@ static int udp6_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
static const struct net_offload udpv6_offload = {
.callbacks = {
- .gso_segment = udp6_tunnel_segment,
+ .gso_segment = udp6_ufo_fragment,
.gro_receive = udp6_gro_receive,
.gro_complete = udp6_gro_complete,
},