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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-10-29 20:33:20 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-10-29 20:33:20 -0700
commit2a26d99b251b8625d27aed14e97fc10707a3a81f (patch)
tree69eb8aa0476294236ceb8a864be9a697e2303ace /net/mac80211
parenta909d3e636995ba7c349e2ca5dbb528154d4ac30 (diff)
parentfceb9c3e38252992bbf1a3028cc2f7b871211533 (diff)
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: "Lots of fixes, mostly drivers as is usually the case. 1) Don't treat zero DMA address as invalid in vmxnet3, from Alexey Khoroshilov. 2) Fix element timeouts in netfilter's nft_dynset, from Anders K. Pedersen. 3) Don't put aead_req crypto struct on the stack in mac80211, from Ard Biesheuvel. 4) Several uninitialized variable warning fixes from Arnd Bergmann. 5) Fix memory leak in cxgb4, from Colin Ian King. 6) Fix bpf handling of VLAN header push/pop, from Daniel Borkmann. 7) Several VRF semantic fixes from David Ahern. 8) Set skb->protocol properly in ip6_tnl_xmit(), from Eli Cooper. 9) Socket needs to be locked in udp_disconnect(), from Eric Dumazet. 10) Div-by-zero on 32-bit fix in mlx4 driver, from Eugenia Emantayev. 11) Fix stale link state during failover in NCSCI driver, from Gavin Shan. 12) Fix netdev lower adjacency list traversal, from Ido Schimmel. 13) Propvide proper handle when emitting notifications of filter deletes, from Jamal Hadi Salim. 14) Memory leaks and big-endian issues in rtl8xxxu, from Jes Sorensen. 15) Fix DESYNC_FACTOR handling in ipv6, from Jiri Bohac. 16) Several routing offload fixes in mlxsw driver, from Jiri Pirko. 17) Fix broadcast sync problem in TIPC, from Jon Paul Maloy. 18) Validate chunk len before using it in SCTP, from Marcelo Ricardo Leitner. 19) Revert a netns locking change that causes regressions, from Paul Moore. 20) Add recursion limit to GRO handling, from Sabrina Dubroca. 21) GFP_KERNEL in irq context fix in ibmvnic, from Thomas Falcon. 22) Avoid accessing stale vxlan/geneve socket in data path, from Pravin Shelar" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (189 commits) geneve: avoid using stale geneve socket. vxlan: avoid using stale vxlan socket. qede: Fix out-of-bound fastpath memory access net: phy: dp83848: add dp83822 PHY support enic: fix rq disable tipc: fix broadcast link synchronization problem ibmvnic: Fix missing brackets in init_sub_crq_irqs ibmvnic: Fix releasing of sub-CRQ IRQs in interrupt context Revert "ibmvnic: Fix releasing of sub-CRQ IRQs in interrupt context" arch/powerpc: Update parameters for csum_tcpudp_magic & csum_tcpudp_nofold net/mlx4_en: Save slave ethtool stats command net/mlx4_en: Fix potential deadlock in port statistics flow net/mlx4: Fix firmware command timeout during interrupt test net/mlx4_core: Do not access comm channel if it has not yet been initialized net/mlx4_en: Fix panic during reboot net/mlx4_en: Process all completions in RX rings after port goes up net/mlx4_en: Resolve dividing by zero in 32-bit system net/mlx4_core: Change the default value of enable_qos net/mlx4_core: Avoid setting ports to auto when only one port type is supported net/mlx4_core: Fix the resource-type enum in res tracker to conform to FW spec ...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c46
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h8
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c43
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h6
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c26
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h4
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/offchannel.c2
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/rx.c51
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c22
9 files changed, 135 insertions, 73 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
index 7663c28ba353..a4e0d59a40dd 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
@@ -18,21 +18,24 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
- size_t mic_len)
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ size_t mic_len)
{
struct scatterlist sg[3];
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ u8 *__aad;
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + CCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+ __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, CCM_AAD_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad));
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
@@ -41,6 +44,9 @@ void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ kzfree(aead_req);
+
+ return 0;
}
int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
@@ -48,18 +54,23 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
size_t mic_len)
{
struct scatterlist sg[3];
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ u8 *__aad;
+ int err;
if (data_len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + CCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, CCM_AAD_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad));
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
@@ -67,7 +78,10 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
- return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ kzfree(aead_req);
+
+ return err;
}
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
index 6a73d1e4d186..fcd3254c5cf0 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
@@ -12,12 +12,14 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#define CCM_AAD_LEN 32
+
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
size_t key_len,
size_t mic_len);
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
- size_t mic_len);
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ size_t mic_len);
int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
size_t mic_len);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c
index 3afe361fd27c..8a4397cc1b08 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c
@@ -15,20 +15,23 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_gcm.h"
-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+int ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
struct scatterlist sg[3];
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ u8 *__aad;
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *)aead_req_data;
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+ __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, GCM_AAD_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad));
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN);
@@ -37,24 +40,31 @@ void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ kzfree(aead_req);
+ return 0;
}
int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
struct scatterlist sg[3];
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *)aead_req_data;
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ u8 *__aad;
+ int err;
if (data_len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, GCM_AAD_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad));
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN);
@@ -63,7 +73,10 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
data_len + IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN, j_0);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
- return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ kzfree(aead_req);
+
+ return err;
}
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
index 1347fda6b76a..55aed5352494 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+#define GCM_AAD_LEN 32
+
+int ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
index 3ddd927aaf30..bd72a862ddb7 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
@@ -17,28 +17,27 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_gmac.h"
-#define GMAC_MIC_LEN 16
-#define GMAC_NONCE_LEN 12
-#define AAD_LEN 20
-
int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
struct scatterlist sg[4];
- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *)aead_req_data;
- u8 zero[GMAC_MIC_LEN], iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 *zero, *__aad, iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
if (data_len < GMAC_MIC_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GMAC_MIC_LEN + GMAC_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ zero = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ __aad = zero + GMAC_MIC_LEN;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN);
- memset(zero, 0, GMAC_MIC_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg, 4);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], aad, AAD_LEN);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len - GMAC_MIC_LEN);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], zero, GMAC_MIC_LEN);
sg_set_buf(&sg[3], mic, GMAC_MIC_LEN);
@@ -49,9 +48,10 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, 0, iv);
- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, AAD_LEN + data_len);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, GMAC_AAD_LEN + data_len);
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ kzfree(aead_req);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
index d328204d73a8..32e6442c95be 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#define GMAC_AAD_LEN 20
+#define GMAC_MIC_LEN 16
+#define GMAC_NONCE_LEN 12
+
struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[],
size_t key_len);
int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
diff --git a/net/mac80211/offchannel.c b/net/mac80211/offchannel.c
index c3f610bba3fe..eede5c6db8d5 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/offchannel.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/offchannel.c
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
mgmt->u.action.category == WLAN_CATEGORY_SPECTRUM_MGMT)
break;
rcu_read_lock();
- sta = sta_info_get(sdata, mgmt->da);
+ sta = sta_info_get_bss(sdata, mgmt->da);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!sta)
return -ENOLINK;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 6175db385ba7..a47bbc973f2d 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2298,6 +2298,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
__le16 fc = hdr->frame_control;
struct sk_buff_head frame_list;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
+ struct ethhdr ethhdr;
+ const u8 *check_da = ethhdr.h_dest, *check_sa = ethhdr.h_source;
if (unlikely(!ieee80211_is_data(fc)))
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -2308,24 +2310,53 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_AMSDU))
return RX_CONTINUE;
- if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control) &&
- rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
- !rx->sdata->u.vlan.sta)
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control))) {
+ switch (rx->sdata->vif.type) {
+ case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
+ if (!rx->sdata->u.vlan.sta)
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ break;
+ case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
+ if (!rx->sdata->u.mgd.use_4addr)
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+ check_da = NULL;
+ check_sa = NULL;
+ } else switch (rx->sdata->vif.type) {
+ case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP:
+ case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
+ check_da = NULL;
+ break;
+ case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
+ if (!rx->sta ||
+ !test_sta_flag(rx->sta, WLAN_STA_TDLS_PEER))
+ check_sa = NULL;
+ break;
+ case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT:
+ check_sa = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
- if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
- ((rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
- rx->sdata->u.vlan.sta) ||
- (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
- rx->sdata->u.mgd.use_4addr)))
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
skb->dev = dev;
__skb_queue_head_init(&frame_list);
+ if (ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, &ethhdr,
+ rx->sdata->vif.addr,
+ rx->sdata->vif.type))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr,
rx->sdata->vif.type,
- rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom, true);
+ rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom,
+ check_da, check_sa);
while (!skb_queue_empty(&frame_list)) {
rx->skb = __skb_dequeue(&frame_list);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index b48c1e13e281..42ce9bd4426f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
@@ -461,10 +461,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
- skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
-
- return 0;
+ return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+ skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
}
@@ -639,7 +637,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
- u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
@@ -696,10 +694,8 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
- ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
- skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
-
- return 0;
+ return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
+ skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
}
ieee80211_tx_result
@@ -1123,9 +1119,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
- u8 aad[20];
+ u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
u64 pn64;
- u8 nonce[12];
+ u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
return TX_DROP;
@@ -1171,7 +1167,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
- u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6], nonce[12];
+ u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], mic[GMAC_MIC_LEN], ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))