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authorXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>2017-06-30 11:52:13 +0800
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-07-01 09:08:41 -0700
commit922dbc5be2186659d2c453a53f2ae569e55b6101 (patch)
tree5d86f92e1e86d0e3da98255617ecafc3db969d89 /net/sctp
parentae146d9b76589d636d11c5e4382bbba2fe8bdb9b (diff)
sctp: remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t, and replace with struct sctp_chunkhdr in the places where it's using this typedef. It is also to fix some indents and use sizeof(variable) instead of sizeof(type)., especially in sctp_new. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/input.c20
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/inqueue.c15
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c17
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c5
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c67
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/ulpevent.c2
6 files changed, 64 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c
index ba9ad32fc447..a9994c4afc18 100644
--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -663,19 +663,19 @@ out_unlock:
*/
static int sctp_rcv_ootb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch, _ch;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch, _ch;
int ch_end, offset = 0;
/* Scan through all the chunks in the packet. */
do {
/* Make sure we have at least the header there */
- if (offset + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) > skb->len)
+ if (offset + sizeof(_ch) > skb->len)
break;
ch = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(*ch), &_ch);
/* Break out if chunk length is less then minimal. */
- if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
+ if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(_ch))
break;
ch_end = offset + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_init_lookup(struct net *net,
*/
static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(
struct net *net,
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch,
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch,
const union sctp_addr *laddr,
__be16 peer_port,
struct sctp_transport **transportp)
@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net,
struct sctp_transport **transportp)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch;
int have_auth = 0;
unsigned int chunk_num = 1;
__u8 *ch_end;
@@ -1152,10 +1152,10 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net,
/* Walk through the chunks looking for AUTH or ASCONF chunks
* to help us find the association.
*/
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) skb->data;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb->data;
do {
/* Break out if chunk length is less then minimal. */
- if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
+ if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*ch))
break;
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net,
if (asoc)
break;
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)ch_end;
chunk_num++;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_lookup_harder(struct net *net,
const union sctp_addr *laddr,
struct sctp_transport **transportp)
{
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch;
/* We do not allow GSO frames here as we need to linearize and
* then cannot guarantee frame boundaries. This shouldn't be an
@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_lookup_harder(struct net *net,
if ((skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_SCTP) == SKB_GSO_SCTP)
return NULL;
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) skb->data;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb->data;
/* The code below will attempt to walk the chunk and extract
* parameter information. Before we do that, we need to verify
diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
index f731de3e8428..48392552ee7c 100644
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ void sctp_inq_push(struct sctp_inq *q, struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch = NULL;
chunk = queue->in_progress;
/* If there is no more chunks in this packet, say so */
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue)
chunk->pdiscard)
return NULL;
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)chunk->chunk_end;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_end;
return ch;
}
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue)
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch = NULL;
/* The assumption is that we are safe to process the chunks
* at this time.
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
} else {
/* Nothing to do. Next chunk in the packet, please. */
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_end;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_end;
/* Force chunk->skb->data to chunk->chunk_end. */
skb_pull(chunk->skb, chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
/* We are guaranteed to pull a SCTP header. */
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ next_chunk:
new_skb:
/* This is the first chunk in the packet. */
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
chunk->singleton = 1;
chunk->data_accepted = 0;
chunk->pdiscard = 0;
@@ -214,11 +214,10 @@ new_skb:
chunk->chunk_hdr = ch;
chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
- skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(*ch));
chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
- if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <
- skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
+ if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* This is not a singleton */
chunk->singleton = 0;
} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 4b1967997c16..7d4c5a870f0e 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1379,20 +1379,20 @@ static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *chunk_hdr;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *chunk_hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk;
/* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */
- skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen), gfp);
+ skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(*chunk_hdr) + paylen), gfp);
if (!skb)
goto nodata;
/* Make room for the chunk header. */
- chunk_hdr = skb_put(skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*chunk_hdr));
chunk_hdr->type = type;
chunk_hdr->flags = flags;
- chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(*chunk_hdr));
sk = asoc ? asoc->base.sk : NULL;
retval = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk, gfp);
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
}
retval->chunk_hdr = chunk_hdr;
- retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
+ retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(*chunk_hdr);
/* Determine if the chunk needs to be authenticated */
if (sctp_auth_send_cid(type, asoc))
@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(
/* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including
* any padding.
*/
- headersize = sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) +
+ headersize = sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) +
(sizeof(struct sctp_signed_cookie) -
sizeof(struct sctp_cookie));
bodysize = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - headersize;
@@ -3218,7 +3218,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
int chunk_len;
__u32 serial;
- chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+ chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) -
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
@@ -3364,7 +3365,7 @@ static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack,
err_code = SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
asconf_ack_len = ntohs(asconf_ack->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
/* Skip the addiphdr from the asconf_ack chunk and store a pointer to
* the first asconf_ack parameter.
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
index dfe1fcb520ba..b255339f22a3 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
@@ -955,9 +955,10 @@ static void sctp_cmd_process_operr(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
switch (err_hdr->cause) {
case SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CHUNK:
{
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *unk_chunk_hdr;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *unk_chunk_hdr;
- unk_chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)err_hdr->variable;
+ unk_chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
+ err_hdr->variable;
switch (unk_chunk_hdr->type) {
/* ADDIP 4.1 A9) If the peer responds to an ASCONF with
* an ERROR chunk reporting that it did not recognized
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 8feff96a5bef..2b7c07f19b08 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_4_C(struct net *net,
return sctp_sf_violation_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE chunk has a valid length. */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
if (err_chunk) {
packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg,
(__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t),
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr),
ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk);
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
len = 0;
if (err_chunk)
len = ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
repl = sctp_make_init_ack(new_asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, len);
if (!repl)
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net,
*/
unk_param = (sctp_unrecognized_param_t *)
((__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
/* Replace the cause code with the "Unrecognized parameter"
* parameter type.
*/
@@ -540,9 +540,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
if (err_chunk) {
packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg,
(__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t),
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr),
ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk);
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
* chunk header. More detailed verification is done
* in sctp_unpack_cookie().
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
chunk->subh.cookie_hdr =
(struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data;
if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
goto nomem;
/* 5.1 D) Upon reception of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, Endpoint
@@ -770,9 +770,10 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
- auth.chunk_hdr = skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
- skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
+ skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+ skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
auth.transport = chunk->transport;
ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
@@ -886,7 +887,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net,
/* Verify that the chunk length for the COOKIE-ACK is OK.
* If we don't do this, any bundled chunks may be junked.
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -1099,7 +1100,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_beat_8_3(struct net *net,
*/
chunk->subh.hb_hdr = (sctp_heartbeathdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
param_hdr = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) chunk->subh.hb_hdr;
- paylen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+ paylen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
if (ntohs(param_hdr->length) > paylen)
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
@@ -1164,7 +1165,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(struct net *net,
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the HEARTBEAT-ACK chunk has a valid length. */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) +
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) +
sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -1469,9 +1470,9 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
if (err_chunk) {
packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg,
(__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t),
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr),
ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
if (packet) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT,
@@ -1535,7 +1536,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
len = 0;
if (err_chunk) {
len = ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
}
repl = sctp_make_init_ack(new_asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, len);
@@ -1556,7 +1557,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
*/
unk_param = (sctp_unrecognized_param_t *)
((__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
/* Replace the cause code with the "Unrecognized parameter"
* parameter type.
*/
@@ -2044,7 +2045,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net,
* enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is
* done later.
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -2053,7 +2054,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net,
*/
chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data;
if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
goto nomem;
/* In RFC 2960 5.2.4 3, if both Verification Tags in the State Cookie
@@ -2806,7 +2807,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net,
struct sctp_chunk *reply;
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -3358,7 +3359,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(struct net *net,
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* 10.2 H) SHUTDOWN COMPLETE notification
@@ -3435,7 +3436,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch;
sctp_errhdr_t *err;
__u8 *ch_end;
int ootb_shut_ack = 0;
@@ -3443,10 +3444,10 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
do {
/* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */
- if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
+ if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*ch))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -3487,7 +3488,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
}
}
- ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
+ ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
if (ootb_shut_ack)
@@ -3560,7 +3561,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(struct net *net,
/* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process
* the reset of the packet.
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent
@@ -3591,7 +3592,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
/* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -4256,7 +4257,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net,
{
struct sctp_chunk *unk_chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
- sctp_chunkhdr_t *hdr;
+ struct sctp_chunkhdr *hdr;
pr_debug("%s: processing unknown chunk id:%d\n", __func__, type.chunk);
@@ -4267,7 +4268,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net,
* Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general
* chunkhdr structure to make a comparison.
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(unk_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(unk_chunk, sizeof(*hdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -4340,7 +4341,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net,
* Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general
* chunkhdr structure to make a comparison.
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
@@ -4405,7 +4406,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
index 17854fb0e512..5f86c5062a98 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make_assoc_change(
/* Trim the buffer to the right length. */
skb_trim(skb, sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_change) +
ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
- sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
} else {
event = sctp_ulpevent_new(sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_change),
MSG_NOTIFICATION, gfp);