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authorDaan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>2023-10-11 20:51:06 +0200
committerMartin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>2023-10-11 17:27:47 -0700
commit859051dd165ec6cc915f0f2114699021144fd249 (patch)
treecfbf41f131a22a07bf294c8e46e438cb0e941781 /net/unix
parent53e380d21441909b12b6e0782b77187ae4b971c4 (diff)
bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix sockets
These hooks allows intercepting connect(), getsockname(), getpeername(), sendmsg() and recvmsg() for unix sockets. The unix socket hooks get write access to the address length because the address length is not fixed when dealing with unix sockets and needs to be modified when a unix socket address is modified by the hook. Because abstract socket unix addresses start with a NUL byte, we cannot recalculate the socket address in kernelspace after running the hook by calculating the length of the unix socket path using strlen(). These hooks can be used when users want to multiplex syscall to a single unix socket to multiple different processes behind the scenes by redirecting the connect() and other syscalls to process specific sockets. We do not implement support for intercepting bind() because when using bind() with unix sockets with a pathname address, this creates an inode in the filesystem which must be cleaned up. If we rewrite the address, the user might try to clean up the wrong file, leaking the socket in the filesystem where it is never cleaned up. Until we figure out a solution for this (and a use case for intercepting bind()), we opt to not allow rewriting the sockaddr in bind() calls. We also implement recvmsg() support for connected streams so that after a connect() that is modified by a sockaddr hook, any corresponding recmvsg() on the connected socket can also be modified to make the connected program think it is connected to the "intended" remote. Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231011185113.140426-5-daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix')
-rw-r--r--net/unix/af_unix.c35
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3e8a04a13668..e10d07c76044 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
+#include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
#include "scm.h"
@@ -1381,6 +1382,10 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (err)
goto out;
+ err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, addr, &alen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
if ((test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags)) &&
!unix_sk(sk)->addr) {
@@ -1490,6 +1495,10 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
if (err)
goto out;
+ err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr, &addr_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
if ((test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags)) && !u->addr) {
err = unix_autobind(sk);
@@ -1770,6 +1779,13 @@ static int unix_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int peer)
} else {
err = addr->len;
memcpy(sunaddr, addr->name, addr->len);
+
+ if (peer)
+ BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, &err,
+ CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME);
+ else
+ BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, &err,
+ CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME);
}
sock_put(sk);
out:
@@ -1922,6 +1938,13 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
err = unix_validate_addr(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen);
if (err)
goto out;
+
+ err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_SENDMSG_LOCK(sk,
+ msg->msg_name,
+ &msg->msg_namelen,
+ NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
@@ -2390,9 +2413,14 @@ int __unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM |
EPOLLWRBAND);
- if (msg->msg_name)
+ if (msg->msg_name) {
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
+ BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_RECVMSG_LOCK(sk,
+ msg->msg_name,
+ &msg->msg_namelen);
+ }
+
if (size > skb->len - skip)
size = skb->len - skip;
else if (size < skb->len - skip)
@@ -2744,6 +2772,11 @@ unlock:
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_un *, sunaddr,
state->msg->msg_name);
unix_copy_addr(state->msg, skb->sk);
+
+ BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_RECVMSG_LOCK(sk,
+ state->msg->msg_name,
+ &state->msg->msg_namelen);
+
sunaddr = NULL;
}