summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net/unix
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-03-08 14:48:40 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-03-08 14:48:40 -0800
commit38e7571c07be01f9f19b355a9306a4e3d5cb0f5b (patch)
tree48812ba46a6fe37ee59d31e0de418f336bbb15ca /net/unix
parent80201fe175cbf7f3e372f53eba0a881a702ad926 (diff)
parent21b4aa5d20fd07207e73270cadffed5c63fb4343 (diff)
Merge tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull io_uring IO interface from Jens Axboe: "Second attempt at adding the io_uring interface. Since the first one, we've added basic unit testing of the three system calls, that resides in liburing like the other unit tests that we have so far. It'll take a while to get full coverage of it, but we're working towards it. I've also added two basic test programs to tools/io_uring. One uses the raw interface and has support for all the various features that io_uring supports outside of standard IO, like fixed files, fixed IO buffers, and polled IO. The other uses the liburing API, and is a simplified version of cp(1). This adds support for a new IO interface, io_uring. io_uring allows an application to communicate with the kernel through two rings, the submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) ring. This allows for very efficient handling of IOs, see the v5 posting for some basic numbers: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20190116175003.17880-1-axboe@kernel.dk/ Outside of just efficiency, the interface is also flexible and extendable, and allows for future use cases like the upcoming NVMe key-value store API, networked IO, and so on. It also supports async buffered IO, something that we've always failed to support in the kernel. Outside of basic IO features, it supports async polled IO as well. This particular feature has already been tested at Facebook months ago for flash storage boxes, with 25-33% improvements. It makes polled IO actually useful for real world use cases, where even basic flash sees a nice win in terms of efficiency, latency, and performance. These boxes were IOPS bound before, now they are not. This series adds three new system calls. One for setting up an io_uring instance (io_uring_setup(2)), one for submitting/completing IO (io_uring_enter(2)), and one for aux functions like registrating file sets, buffers, etc (io_uring_register(2)). Through the help of Arnd, I've coordinated the syscall numbers so merge on that front should be painless. Jon did a writeup of the interface a while back, which (except for minor details that have been tweaked) is still accurate. Find that here: https://lwn.net/Articles/776703/ Huge thanks to Al Viro for helping getting the reference cycle code correct, and to Jann Horn for his extensive reviews focused on both security and bugs in general. There's a userspace library that provides basic functionality for applications that don't need or want to care about how to fiddle with the rings directly. It has helpers to allow applications to easily set up an io_uring instance, and submit/complete IO through it without knowing about the intricacies of the rings. It also includes man pages (thanks to Jeff Moyer), and will continue to grow support helper functions and features as time progresses. Find it here: git://git.kernel.dk/liburing Fio has full support for the raw interface, both in the form of an IO engine (io_uring), but also with a small test application (t/io_uring) that can exercise and benchmark the interface" * tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: io_uring: add a few test tools io_uring: allow workqueue item to handle multiple buffered requests io_uring: add support for IORING_OP_POLL io_uring: add io_kiocb ref count io_uring: add submission polling io_uring: add file set registration net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers block: implement bio helper to add iter bvec pages to bio io_uring: batch io_kiocb allocation io_uring: use fget/fput_many() for file references fs: add fget_many() and fput_many() io_uring: support for IO polling io_uring: add fsync support Add io_uring IO interface
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix')
-rw-r--r--net/unix/Kconfig5
-rw-r--r--net/unix/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--net/unix/af_unix.c63
-rw-r--r--net/unix/garbage.c68
-rw-r--r--net/unix/scm.c151
-rw-r--r--net/unix/scm.h10
6 files changed, 172 insertions, 127 deletions
diff --git a/net/unix/Kconfig b/net/unix/Kconfig
index 8b31ab85d050..3b9e450656a4 100644
--- a/net/unix/Kconfig
+++ b/net/unix/Kconfig
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ config UNIX
Say Y unless you know what you are doing.
+config UNIX_SCM
+ bool
+ depends on UNIX
+ default y
+
config UNIX_DIAG
tristate "UNIX: socket monitoring interface"
depends on UNIX
diff --git a/net/unix/Makefile b/net/unix/Makefile
index ffd0a275c3a7..54e58cc4f945 100644
--- a/net/unix/Makefile
+++ b/net/unix/Makefile
@@ -10,3 +10,5 @@ unix-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_unix.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG) += unix_diag.o
unix_diag-y := diag.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM) += scm.o
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index a95d479caeea..ddb838a1b74c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -119,6 +119,8 @@
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include "scm.h"
+
struct hlist_head unix_socket_table[2 * UNIX_HASH_SIZE];
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unix_socket_table);
DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_table_lock);
@@ -1496,67 +1498,6 @@ out:
return err;
}
-static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- int i;
-
- scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
- UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
-
- for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
-}
-
-static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- struct scm_cookie scm;
- memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
- scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
- if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
- unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
-
- /* Alas, it calls VFS */
- /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
- scm_destroy(&scm);
- sock_wfree(skb);
-}
-
-/*
- * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
- * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
- * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
- * it across threads. Tough.
- */
-static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- struct user_struct *user = current_user();
-
- if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
- return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
- return false;
-}
-
-static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
- return -ETOOMANYREFS;
-
- /*
- * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
- * collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
- * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
- */
- UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
- if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
- return 0;
-}
-
static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
{
int err = 0;
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index c36757e72844..8bbe1b8e4ff7 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -86,77 +86,13 @@
#include <net/scm.h>
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
+#include "scm.h"
+
/* Internal data structures and random procedures: */
-static LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list);
static LIST_HEAD(gc_candidates);
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(unix_gc_wait);
-unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
-
-struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
-{
- struct sock *u_sock = NULL;
- struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
-
- /* Socket ? */
- if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
- struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- struct sock *s = sock->sk;
-
- /* PF_UNIX ? */
- if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX)
- u_sock = s;
- }
- return u_sock;
-}
-
-/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file
- * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
- */
-
-void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
-{
- struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
-
- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
-
- if (s) {
- struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
-
- if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
- BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
- list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
- } else {
- BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
- }
- unix_tot_inflight++;
- }
- user->unix_inflight++;
- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
-}
-
-void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
-{
- struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
-
- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
-
- if (s) {
- struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
-
- BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight));
- BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
-
- if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
- list_del_init(&u->link);
- unix_tot_inflight--;
- }
- user->unix_inflight--;
- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
-}
-
static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
struct sk_buff_head *hitlist)
{
diff --git a/net/unix/scm.c b/net/unix/scm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8c40f2b32392
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/unix/scm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <net/scm.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+#include "scm.h"
+
+unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_tot_inflight);
+
+LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gc_inflight_list);
+
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_gc_lock);
+
+struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct sock *u_sock = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
+
+ /* Socket ? */
+ if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
+ struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+ struct sock *s = sock->sk;
+
+ /* PF_UNIX ? */
+ if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX)
+ u_sock = s;
+ } else {
+ /* Could be an io_uring instance */
+ u_sock = io_uring_get_socket(filp);
+ }
+ return u_sock;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_get_socket);
+
+/* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file
+ * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
+ */
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
+{
+ struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
+ if (s) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
+
+ if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
+ list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
+ } else {
+ BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
+ }
+ unix_tot_inflight++;
+ }
+ user->unix_inflight++;
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+}
+
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
+{
+ struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
+ if (s) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
+
+ BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight));
+ BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
+
+ if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
+ list_del_init(&u->link);
+ unix_tot_inflight--;
+ }
+ user->unix_inflight--;
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
+ * it across threads. Tough.
+ */
+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+
+ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ return false;
+}
+
+int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
+ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
+
+ /*
+ * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
+ * collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
+ * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
+ */
+ UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
+ if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_attach_fds);
+
+void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
+ UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
+
+ for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
+ unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_detach_fds);
+
+void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct scm_cookie scm;
+
+ memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
+ scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
+ if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
+ unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
+
+ /* Alas, it calls VFS */
+ /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
+ scm_destroy(&scm);
+ sock_wfree(skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_destruct_scm);
diff --git a/net/unix/scm.h b/net/unix/scm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5a255a477f16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/unix/scm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef NET_UNIX_SCM_H
+#define NET_UNIX_SCM_H
+
+extern struct list_head gc_inflight_list;
+extern spinlock_t unix_gc_lock;
+
+int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb);
+void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+#endif