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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2012-10-16 07:32:07 +1030
committerRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>2012-12-14 13:05:24 +1030
commit2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839 (patch)
treeb8190d17aa5d59508f8c979ce0160f21bef89500 /security/capability.c
parent2f3238aebedb243804f58d62d57244edec4149b2 (diff)
security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example, read extended attributes for signatures, etc. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c6
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index b14a30c234b8..0fe5a026aef8 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
return 0;
}
+static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return 0;
@@ -967,6 +972,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);