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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-01-02 09:43:14 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-01-02 09:43:14 -0800
commitf218a29c25ad8abdb961435d6b8139f462061364 (patch)
treec5ef7e5b8730be6f5a5c1c16517c3b2dc2fa6b70 /security/integrity/Kconfig
parent8e143b90e4d45cca3dc53760d3cfab988bc74571 (diff)
parentc7f7e58fcbf33589f11bfde0506e076a00627e59 (diff)
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: integrity: Remove references to module keyring ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser efi: Add EFI signature data types integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 ima: add support for arch specific policies ima: refactor ima_init_policy() ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/Kconfig')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/Kconfig11
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 877af1f2d904..2ea4ec9991d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
.evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted
keyring.
+config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ depends on EFI
+ help
+ Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
+ the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
+ provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
+ and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
+
config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
depends on AUDIT