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authorMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2021-04-26 18:13:45 -0400
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2021-05-20 19:48:30 -0400
commit49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 (patch)
tree745008ece0fc7da7b66141a4358d4e19552dd7dc /security/integrity/evm
parentd07f6ca923ea0927a1024dfccafc5b53b61cfecc (diff)
evm: fix writing <securityfs>/evm overflow
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX. The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned int. Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c5
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index bbc85637e18b..0007d3362754 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int i, ret;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
return -EPERM;
- ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
+ ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
if (ret)
return ret;