Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from James Morris:

 - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:

     * several bug fixes and cleanups

     * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
       on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
       securityfs symlinks

     * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
       carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
       converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
       base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
       will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
       a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.

     * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
       features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
       Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
       of this.

 - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
   permission. From Paul:

      "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
       the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.

       Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
       Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
       labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
       capabilities on policy load"

   There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
   lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.

 - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
   cap_capable call in privilege check.

 - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.

 - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
   LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.

 - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
   the boot command line.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
  apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
  seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
  seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
  seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
  IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
  ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
  ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
  integrity: Small code improvements
  ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
  ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
  ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
  ima: use memdup_user_nul
  ima: fix up #endif comments
  IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
  ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
  ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
  ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
  ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
  ...

1 files changed, 46 insertions, 60 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 6f885fab9d84..95209a5f8595 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
 };
 
@@ -139,6 +141,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
 	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
 	.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
@@ -153,6 +156,17 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 #endif
 };
 
+static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+};
+
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
@@ -170,19 +184,27 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
+static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 {
-	if (ima_policy)
-		return 1;
+	char *p;
 
-	if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
-		ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+	while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) {
+		if (*p == ' ')
+			continue;
+		if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
+			ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
+			ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
+			ima_use_secure_boot = 1;
+	}
 
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
 
-static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
 	ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
@@ -405,12 +427,14 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
  */
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
+	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
 
 	/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
 	measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
 	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
 			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
+	secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
+			ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
 		list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -429,6 +453,14 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
+	 * any other appraise rules.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
+		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
+			      &ima_default_rules);
+
 	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
 		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
 			      &ima_default_rules);
@@ -931,30 +963,17 @@ enum {
 	mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
 };
 
-static char *mask_tokens[] = {
+static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
 	"MAY_EXEC",
 	"MAY_WRITE",
 	"MAY_READ",
 	"MAY_APPEND"
 };
 
-enum {
-	func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
-	func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
-	func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
-	func_policy
-};
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
 
-static char *func_tokens[] = {
-	"FILE_CHECK",
-	"MMAP_CHECK",
-	"BPRM_CHECK",
-	"MODULE_CHECK",
-	"FIRMWARE_CHECK",
-	"POST_SETATTR",
-	"KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
-	"KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
-	"POLICY_CHECK"
+static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
 };
 
 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
@@ -991,49 +1010,16 @@ void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 #define pt(token)	policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
 #define mt(token)	mask_tokens[token]
-#define ft(token)	func_tokens[token]
 
 /*
  * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
  */
 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-	char tbuf[64] = {0,};
-
-	switch (func) {
-	case FILE_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
-		break;
-	case MMAP_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
-		break;
-	case BPRM_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
-		break;
-	case MODULE_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
-		break;
-	case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
-		break;
-	case POST_SETATTR:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
-		break;
-	case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel));
-		break;
-	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
-		break;
-	case POLICY_CHECK:
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
-		break;
-	default:
-		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
-		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
-		break;
-	}
-	seq_puts(m, " ");
+	if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
+		seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
+	else
+		seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
 }
 
 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)