Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - TPM core and driver updates/fixes
   - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
   - Lots of Apparmor fixes
   - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
     syscall #"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
  apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
  tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
  tpm: Factor out common startup code
  tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
  tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
  tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
  tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
  tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
  apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
  apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
  apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
  apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
  apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
  apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
  apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
  apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
  apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
  apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
  apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
  apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
  ...

1 files changed, 22 insertions, 48 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 89df64672b89..082b20c78363 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 				     struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct context lo_scontext;
-	struct context lo_tcontext;
+	struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
 	struct av_decision lo_avd;
 	struct type_datum *source;
 	struct type_datum *target;
@@ -553,67 +553,41 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 				    scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!source);
 
+	if (!source->bounds)
+		return;
+
 	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!target);
 
-	if (source->bounds) {
-		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-
-		memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
-		lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+	memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
 
-		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
-					  tcontext,
-					  tclass,
-					  &lo_avd,
-					  NULL);
-		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
-			return;		/* no masked permission */
-		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
-	}
+	memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+	lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
 
 	if (target->bounds) {
-		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-
 		memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
 		lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
-
-		context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
-					  &lo_tcontext,
-					  tclass,
-					  &lo_avd,
-					  NULL);
-		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
-			return;		/* no masked permission */
-		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+		tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
 	}
 
-	if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
-		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-		/*
-		 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
-		 * set up.
-		 */
+	context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+				  tcontextp,
+				  tclass,
+				  &lo_avd,
+				  NULL);
 
-		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
-					  &lo_tcontext,
-					  tclass,
-					  &lo_avd,
-					  NULL);
-		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
-			return;		/* no masked permission */
-		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
-	}
+	masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
 
-	if (masked) {
-		/* mask violated permissions */
-		avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+	if (likely(!masked))
+		return;		/* no masked permission */
 
-		/* audit masked permissions */
-		security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
-					tclass, masked, "bounds");
-	}
+	/* mask violated permissions */
+	avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+	/* audit masked permissions */
+	security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+				tclass, masked, "bounds");
 }
 
 /*