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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-08-04 14:27:25 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-08-04 14:27:25 -0700
commit3950e975431bc914f7e81b8f2a2dbdf2064acb0f (patch)
tree32adad006224780b83a23201f97368fb45bd4354 /security
parentfd76a74d940ae3d6b8b2395cd12914630c7e1739 (diff)
parent7fce69dff8db30cb93aace0bbebda09972027af7 (diff)
Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman: "During the development of v5.7 I ran into bugs and quality of implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been diggin into exec and cleaning up what I can. This cycle I have been looking at different ideas and different implementations to see what is possible to improve exec, and cleaning the way exec interfaces with in kernel users. Only cleaning up the interfaces of exec with rest of the kernel has managed to stabalize and make it through review in time for v5.9-rc1 resulting in 2 sets of changes this cycle. - Implement kernel_execve - Make the user mode driver code a better citizen With kernel_execve the code size got a little larger as the copying of parameters from userspace and copying of parameters from userspace is now separate. The good news is kernel threads no longer need to play games with set_fs to use exec. Which when combined with the rest of Christophs set_fs changes should security bugs with set_fs much more difficult" * 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits) exec: Implement kernel_execve exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm exec: Move initialization of bprm->filename into alloc_bprm exec: Factor out alloc_bprm exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h umd: Stop using split_argv umd: Remove exit_umh bpfilter: Take advantage of the facilities of struct pid exit: Factor thread_group_exited out of pidfd_poll umd: Track user space drivers with struct pid bpfilter: Move bpfilter_umh back into init data exec: Remove do_execve_file umh: Stop calling do_execve_file umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into fork_usermode_driver umd: Rename umd_info.cmdline umd_info.driver_name umd: For clarity rename umh_info umd_info umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support umh: Remove call_usermodehelper_setup_file. ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/domain.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c4
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 050473df5809..85246b9df7ca 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ struct tomoyo_request_info {
struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj;
/*
* For holding parameters specific to execve() request.
- * NULL if not dealing do_execve().
+ * NULL if not dealing execve().
*/
struct tomoyo_execve *ee;
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 7869d6a9980b..53b3e1f5f227 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ retry:
/*
* Check for domain transition preference if "file execute" matched.
- * If preference is given, make do_execve() fail if domain transition
+ * If preference is given, make execve() fail if domain transition
* has failed, for domain transition preference should be used with
* destination domain defined.
*/
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ force_reset_domain:
snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "<%s>",
candidate->name);
/*
- * Make do_execve() fail if domain transition across namespaces
+ * Make execve() fail if domain transition across namespaces
* has failed.
*/
reject_on_transition_failure = true;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index f9adddc42ac8..1f3cd432d830 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/*
- * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
+ * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to execve()
* using current domain.
*/
if (!s->old_domain_info) {
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
*/
static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f)
{
- /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
+ /* Don't check read permission here if called from execve(). */
if (current->in_execve)
return 0;
return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path,