Merge tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Restrict linking of keys to .ima and .evm keyrings based on
   digitalSignature attribute in the certificate

 - PowerVM: load machine owner keys into the .machine [1] keyring

 - PowerVM: load module signing keys into the secondary trusted keyring
   (keys blessed by the vendor)

 - tpm_tis_spi: half-duplex transfer mode

 - tpm_tis: retry corrupted transfers

 - Apply revocation list (.mokx) to an all system keyrings (e.g.
   .machine keyring)

Link: https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/the-machine-keyring [1]

* tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings
  tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Use module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code
  tpm: remove redundant variable len
  tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors
  tpm_tis: Use responseRetry to recover from data transfer errors
  tpm_tis: Move CRC check to generic send routine
  tpm_tis_spi: Add hardware wait polling
  KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy
  integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
  integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
  integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
  integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
  integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
  integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
  integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyrings
  KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction
  tpm_tis: Revert "tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s"

10 files changed, 94 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index ec6e0d789da1..232191ee09e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
 	help
 	 If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
 	 be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys.  Unlike keys
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 6f31ffe23c48..df387de29bfa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
-#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary
 #else
-#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin
 #endif
 
 static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
 	} else {
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
 			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
-		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist())
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled())
 			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
 			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index a6e19d23e700..fba9ee359bc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ config EVM_LOAD_X509
 
 	   This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel
 	   onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.  A public key can be used to
-	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process.
+	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. The
+	   key must have digitalSignature usage set.
 
 config EVM_X509_PATH
 	string "EVM X509 certificate path"
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 60a511c6b583..684425936c53 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -270,7 +270,8 @@ config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
 	help
 	  Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
 	  key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or
-	  secondary trusted keyrings.
+	  secondary trusted keyrings. The key must also have the
+	  digitalSignature usage set.
 
 	  Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the
 	  IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7167a6e99bdc..d7553c93f5c0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
-bool __init trust_moklist(void);
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
 						  const void *data, size_t len)
 {
 }
-static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+
+static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
 {
 	return false;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index 8a1124e4d769..13ea17207902 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 {
 	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) &&
+		    imputed_trust_enabled())
 			return add_to_machine_keyring;
 		else
 			return add_to_platform_keyring;
@@ -69,6 +70,22 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_machine_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
+		return add_to_secondary_keyring;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
  * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 212d894a8c0c..f92895cc50f6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
 
 /*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
  * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
  */
 efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
index 170789dc63d2..c85febca3343 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size)
 static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 {
 	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	void *trustedca;
+	void *moduledb;
 	u64 dsize = 0;
 	u64 offset = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -120,6 +122,38 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		kfree(data);
 	}
 
+	data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_ca_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9,  &dsize);
+	if (!data) {
+		pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n");
+	} else if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(data);
+		pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc);
+	} else {
+		extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset);
+
+		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize,
+					      get_handler_for_code_signing_keys);
+		if (rc)
+			pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
index 7aaed7950b6e..a401640a63cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
-static bool trust_mok;
-
 static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -36,7 +34,8 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t
 	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
 	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
 	 */
-	if (rc && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+	if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) &&
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
 		rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
 					 data, len, perm);
 
@@ -62,12 +61,14 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
-bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+static bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 {
 	static bool initialized;
+	static bool trust_mok;
 
 	if (!initialized) {
 		initialized = true;
+		trust_mok = false;
 
 		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
 			trust_mok = true;
@@ -75,3 +76,16 @@ bool __init trust_moklist(void)
 
 	return trust_mok;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading
+ * on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable,
+ * and for other platforms, it is always enabled.
+ */
+bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+		return trust_moklist();
+
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 41e9735006d0..8f33cd170e42 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
-	strlcpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op));
+	strscpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op));
 
 	/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
 	 * another process */