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authorJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>2016-01-20 15:00:04 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-01-20 17:09:18 -0800
commitcaaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 (patch)
tree6227530109dd91ab5447fbd2211f09bc636845a7 /security
parent3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 (diff)
ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c7
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 1832cf701c3d..48071ed7c445 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -137,12 +137,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+ const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = current_cred();
child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+ caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
+ else
+ caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
- cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;