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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-31 13:12:31 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-31 13:12:31 -0800
commitae0cb7be35fe6c7e8bcc816ec4185d0a37748cc1 (patch)
tree2453151c8d507502ce91c6827f3e8a35e1777996 /security
parent2a7149031457c5dd05f670737a9dd5d32524f145 (diff)
parentebceb1c87c0c482d47cb92dc3cc51d28f7387716 (diff)
Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris: - reduce polling delays in tpm_tis - support retrieving TPM 2.0 Event Log through EFI before ExitBootServices - replace tpm-rng.c with a hwrng device managed by the driver for each TPM device - TPM resource manager synthesizes TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response instead of returning -EINVAL for unknown TPM commands. This makes user space more sound. - CLKRUN fixes: * Keep #CLKRUN disable through the entier TPM command/response flow * Check whether #CLKRUN is enabled before disabling and enabling it again because enabling it breaks PS/2 devices on a system where it is disabled * 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: tpm: remove unused variables tpm: remove unused data fields from I2C and OF device ID tables tpm: only attempt to disable the LPC CLKRUN if is already enabled tpm: follow coding style for variable declaration in tpm_tis_core_init() tpm: delete the TPM_TIS_CLK_ENABLE flag tpm: Update MAINTAINERS for Jason Gunthorpe tpm: Keep CLKRUN enabled throughout the duration of transmit_cmd() tpm_tis: Move ilb_base_addr to tpm_tis_data tpm2-cmd: allow more attempts for selftest execution tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get() tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices tpm: add event log format version tpm: rename event log provider files tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder tpm: use tpm_msleep() value as max delay tpm: reduce tpm polling delay in tpm_tis_core tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c35
4 files changed, 20 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 9057b163c378..205bc69361ea 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
if (!ima_used_chip)
return;
- if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
+ if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 2967d497a665..29b72cd2502e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
int rc;
ima_used_chip = 0;
- rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
+ rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i);
if (rc == 0)
ima_used_chip = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index a02a86d51102..418f35e38015 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
if (!ima_used_chip)
return result;
- result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
+ result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash);
if (result != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
return result;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 98aa89ff7bfd..423776682025 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ out:
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
*/
-static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
- size_t buflen)
+static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
- rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+ rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen);
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
if (rc > 0)
/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
@@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return ret;
- return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
/*
@@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
@@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
store32(tb, handle);
storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
int i;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
size_t key_len;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_load:
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
else
ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
dump_payload(payload);
@@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
break;
case Opt_new:
key_len = payload->key_len;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len);
if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
else
ret = key_seal(payload, options);
if (ret < 0)