summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-01-17 00:00:25 -0500
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-01-17 00:10:42 -0500
commitc02b3741eb99a1ec733e6134c53ba59e43e19e97 (patch)
treeff7dd96c32dec2abe530e7101378443dabcb8962 /security
parent7018d1b3f20fb4308ed9bc577160cb8ffb79b62a (diff)
parent8cbab92dff778e516064c13113ca15d4869ec883 (diff)
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Overlapping changes all over. The mini-qdisc bits were a little bit tricky, however. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c9
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/perms.h3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c53
4 files changed, 41 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 3d4debd0257e..b0cb9a5f9448 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
into userspace.
- See Documentation/x86/pagetable-isolation.txt for more details.
+ See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 04ba9d0718ea..6a54d2ffa840 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -330,10 +330,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
continue;
if (profile->xmatch) {
- if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
- conflict = true;
- continue;
- } else if (profile->xmatch_len > len) {
+ if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
unsigned int state;
u32 perm;
@@ -342,6 +339,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+ if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
+ conflict = true;
+ continue;
+ }
candidate = profile;
len = profile->xmatch_len;
conflict = false;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
index 2b27bb79aec4..d7b7e7115160 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
#define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...) \
xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
+#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2) \
+ xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
+
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 7ca0032e7ba9..b40678f3c1d5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -64,40 +64,48 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
/* TODO: conditionals */
static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
- /* need because of peer in cross check */
- if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
- !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return 0;
-
- aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
- aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+ aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+ aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
&perms);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
-static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
- struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+ !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return 0;
+
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+ struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+ return 0;
+
if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
- profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
- request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
- sa));
- /* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
- if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+ /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+ if (&tracer->label == tracee)
return 0;
aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
- aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
+ aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
aad(sa)->request = 0;
aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
@@ -115,10 +123,13 @@ static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
u32 request)
{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
- return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
- request, &sa);
+ return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+ profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+ profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
}