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authorBruno E. O. Meneguele <brdeoliv@redhat.com>2017-10-24 15:37:01 -0200
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2017-11-08 15:16:36 -0500
commit7c9bc0983f890ed9782e755a0e070930cd979333 (patch)
treeec73590d9c6cee188bdd2a1a29971cd9c472d756 /security
parentfda784e50aace694ec2e4e16e2de07b91a938563 (diff)
ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE. This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param). Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <brdeoliv@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index d6ddaad91e82..770654694efc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -362,12 +362,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*/
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
+ bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+ if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-#endif
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
return 0;