summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>2021-11-02 08:02:50 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2021-11-03 11:09:20 +0000
commite7310c94024cdf099c0d29e6903dd6fe9205bb60 (patch)
tree8340d44e4090a192e8ce269bcf7cfa759425501c /security
parent7c2ef0240e6abfd3cc59511339517358350a8910 (diff)
security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs. Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for its asoc. v1->v2: - call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej suggested. - when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c14
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 62d30c0a30c2..5e5215fe2e83 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5502,7 +5502,8 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
- newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
+ if (asoc->secid != SECSID_WILD)
+ newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
@@ -5558,6 +5559,16 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
+static void selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+
+ selinux_inet_conn_established(asoc->base.sk, skb);
+ asoc->peer_secid = sksec->peer_sid;
+ asoc->secid = SECSID_WILD;
+}
+
static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
@@ -7228,6 +7239,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),