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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-09-27 19:37:27 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-09-27 19:37:27 -0700
commitf1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f (patch)
tree7c363b95df8d63954e822c98462fd3a9a98794ae /tools
parent298fb76a5583900a155d387efaf37a8b39e5dea2 (diff)
parent2a7f0e53daf29ca6dc9fbe2a27158f13474ec1b5 (diff)
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size(). In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules. Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature. This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.) The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc() ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc() sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig) ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig() MODSIGN: make new include file self contained ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request ima: always return negative code for error ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig ima: Define ima-modsig template ima: Collect modsig ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement() ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest() PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature() MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
-rwxr-xr-xtools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh38
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh
index fa7c24e8eefb..2ff600388c30 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh
@@ -37,11 +37,20 @@ is_ima_sig_required()
# sequentially. As a result, a policy rule may be defined, but
# might not necessarily be used. This test assumes if a policy
# rule is specified, that is the intent.
+
+ # First check for appended signature (modsig), then xattr
if [ $ima_read_policy -eq 1 ]; then
check_ima_policy "appraise" "func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" \
- "appraise_type=imasig"
+ "appraise_type=imasig|modsig"
ret=$?
- [ $ret -eq 1 ] && log_info "IMA signature required";
+ if [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+ log_info "IMA or appended(modsig) signature required"
+ else
+ check_ima_policy "appraise" "func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" \
+ "appraise_type=imasig"
+ ret=$?
+ [ $ret -eq 1 ] && log_info "IMA signature required";
+ fi
fi
return $ret
}
@@ -84,6 +93,22 @@ check_for_imasig()
return $ret
}
+# Return 1 for appended signature (modsig) found and 0 for not found.
+check_for_modsig()
+{
+ local module_sig_string="~Module signature appended~"
+ local sig="$(tail --bytes $((${#module_sig_string} + 1)) $KERNEL_IMAGE)"
+ local ret=0
+
+ if [ "$sig" == "$module_sig_string" ]; then
+ ret=1
+ log_info "kexec kernel image modsig signed"
+ else
+ log_info "kexec kernel image not modsig signed"
+ fi
+ return $ret
+}
+
kexec_file_load_test()
{
local succeed_msg="kexec_file_load succeeded"
@@ -98,7 +123,8 @@ kexec_file_load_test()
# In secureboot mode with an architecture specific
# policy, make sure either an IMA or PE signature exists.
if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ] && \
- [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+ [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ] \
+ && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing sig)"
fi
@@ -107,7 +133,8 @@ kexec_file_load_test()
log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing PE sig)"
fi
- if [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+ if [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
+ && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
fi
@@ -204,5 +231,8 @@ pe_signed=$?
check_for_imasig
ima_signed=$?
+check_for_modsig
+ima_modsig=$?
+
# Test loading the kernel image via kexec_file_load syscall
kexec_file_load_test