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-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy6
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c8
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_file.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig12
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c12
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c17
8 files changed, 24 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 49db0ff288e5..c2385183826c 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ Description:
stored in security.ima xattr. Requires
specifying "digest_type=verity" first.)
- appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
- Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
- signature.
+ appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist] (deprecated)
+ Setting the check_blacklist flag is no longer necessary.
+ All appraisal functions set it by default.
digest_type:= verity
Require fs-verity's file digest instead of the
regular IMA file hash.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
index 957abd592075..b7029beed847 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
* is not enabled.
*/
static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
- "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+ "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
- "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
#endif
NULL
};
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ static const char *const trusted_rules[] = {
static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
"measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
- "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+ "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
- "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
#endif
NULL
};
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index e2ec9d7b9a1f..f9a419cd22d4 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
* kexec_add_buffer - place a buffer in a kexec segment
* @kbuf: Buffer contents and memory parameters.
*
- * This function assumes that kexec_mutex is held.
+ * This function assumes that kexec_lock is held.
* On successful return, @kbuf->mem will have the physical address of
* the buffer in memory.
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 684425936c53..ecddc807c536 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -248,18 +248,6 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook
to accept such signatures.
-config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
- depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- default y
- help
- This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
- keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
-
- This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-
config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 491c1aca0b1c..870dde67707b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -458,11 +458,13 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
ima_get_modsig_digest(modsig, &hash_algo, &digest, &digestsize);
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
- if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
- process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, digest, digestsize,
- "blacklisted-hash", NONE,
- pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0);
- }
+ } else if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED && iint->ima_hash)
+ rc = is_binary_blacklisted(iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length);
+
+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
+ process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, digest, digestsize,
+ "blacklisted-hash", NONE,
+ pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
index 9db66fe310d4..138029bfcce1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
+ "appraise func=POLICY_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif
"measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
NULL
};
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index 419dc405c831..ad133fe120db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ out:
* Called during kexec_file_load so that IMA can add a segment to the kexec
* image for the measurement list for the next kernel.
*
- * This function assumes that kexec_mutex is held.
+ * This function assumes that kexec_lock is held.
*/
void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 7a0420cf1a6a..f69062617754 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
IMA_FSNAME | IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
- IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED))
+ IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED))
return false;
break;
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
/* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
- !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+ !(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
return false;
/*
@@ -1803,11 +1803,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
result = -EINVAL;
else
- entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
} else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
/* Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now */
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
- entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
else
result = -EINVAL;
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
@@ -1816,18 +1816,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = -EINVAL;
else
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
- IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
+ IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
} else {
result = -EINVAL;
}
break;
case Opt_appraise_flag:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
- strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
- entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
- else
- result = -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_appraise_algos:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_algos", args[0].from);
@@ -2271,8 +2266,6 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
seq_puts(m, "digest_type=verity ");
- if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)
- seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
rcu_read_unlock();