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-rw-r--r--drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/user_namespace.h3
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/capability.h3
-rw-r--r--kernel/gcov/clang.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/trace.c10
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c65
6 files changed, 78 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c
index eb6c02bc4a02..b8b771b643cc 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/meson-gx-mmc.c
@@ -247,8 +247,9 @@ static void meson_mmc_get_transfer_mode(struct mmc_host *mmc,
*/
for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
if (sg->length % data->blksz) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "unaligned sg len %u blksize %u\n",
- sg->length, data->blksz);
+ dev_warn_once(mmc_dev(mmc),
+ "unaligned sg len %u blksize %u, disabling descriptor DMA for transfer\n",
+ sg->length, data->blksz);
return;
}
}
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 64cf8ebdc4ec..f6c5f784be5a 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
kgid_t group;
struct ns_common ns;
unsigned long flags;
+ /* parent_could_setfcap: true if the creator if this ns had CAP_SETFCAP
+ * in its effective capability set at the child ns creation time. */
+ bool parent_could_setfcap;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* List of joinable keyrings in this namespace. Modification access of
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index c6ca33034147..2ddb4226cd23 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -335,7 +335,8 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
-/* Set or remove capabilities on files */
+/* Set or remove capabilities on files.
+ Map uid=0 into a child user namespace. */
#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
diff --git a/kernel/gcov/clang.c b/kernel/gcov/clang.c
index b81f2823630d..c466c7fbdece 100644
--- a/kernel/gcov/clang.c
+++ b/kernel/gcov/clang.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static struct gcov_fn_info *gcov_fn_info_dup(struct gcov_fn_info *fn)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fn_dup->head);
cv_size = fn->num_counters * sizeof(fn->counters[0]);
- fn_dup->counters = kvmalloc(cv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ fn_dup->counters = vmalloc(cv_size);
if (!fn_dup->counters) {
kfree(fn_dup);
return NULL;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 5c777627212f..c0c9aa5cd8e2 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -3545,7 +3545,11 @@ static char *trace_iter_expand_format(struct trace_iterator *iter)
{
char *tmp;
- if (iter->fmt == static_fmt_buf)
+ /*
+ * iter->tr is NULL when used with tp_printk, which makes
+ * this get called where it is not safe to call krealloc().
+ */
+ if (!iter->tr || iter->fmt == static_fmt_buf)
return NULL;
tmp = krealloc(iter->fmt, iter->fmt_size + STATIC_FMT_BUF_SIZE,
@@ -3566,7 +3570,7 @@ const char *trace_event_format(struct trace_iterator *iter, const char *fmt)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fmt))
return fmt;
- if (iter->tr->trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_HASH_PTR)
+ if (!iter->tr || iter->tr->trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_HASH_PTR)
return fmt;
p = fmt;
@@ -9692,7 +9696,7 @@ void __init early_trace_init(void)
{
if (tracepoint_printk) {
tracepoint_print_iter =
- kmalloc(sizeof(*tracepoint_print_iter), GFP_KERNEL);
+ kzalloc(sizeof(*tracepoint_print_iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (MEM_FAIL(!tracepoint_print_iter,
"Failed to allocate trace iterator\n"))
tracepoint_printk = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index af612945a4d0..9a4b980d695b 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
if (!ns)
goto fail_dec;
+ ns->parent_could_setfcap = cap_raised(new->cap_effective, CAP_SETFCAP);
ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
if (ret)
goto fail_free;
@@ -841,6 +842,60 @@ static int sort_idmaps(struct uid_gid_map *map)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * verify_root_map() - check the uid 0 mapping
+ * @file: idmapping file
+ * @map_ns: user namespace of the target process
+ * @new_map: requested idmap
+ *
+ * If a process requests mapping parent uid 0 into the new ns, verify that the
+ * process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP capability as the target process
+ * will be able to write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user namespaces.
+ *
+ * Return: true if the mapping is allowed, false if not.
+ */
+static bool verify_root_map(const struct file *file,
+ struct user_namespace *map_ns,
+ struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
+{
+ int idx;
+ const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns;
+ struct uid_gid_extent *extent0 = NULL;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
+ if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
+ extent0 = &new_map->extent[idx];
+ else
+ extent0 = &new_map->forward[idx];
+ if (extent0->lower_first == 0)
+ break;
+
+ extent0 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!extent0)
+ return true;
+
+ if (map_ns == file_ns) {
+ /* The process unshared its ns and is writing to its own
+ * /proc/self/uid_map. User already has full capabilites in
+ * the new namespace. Verify that the parent had CAP_SETFCAP
+ * when it unshared.
+ * */
+ if (!file_ns->parent_could_setfcap)
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ /* Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who is in a child
+ * user namespace to p1's. Verify that the opener of the map
+ * file has CAP_SETFCAP against the parent of the new map
+ * namespace */
+ if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int cap_setid,
@@ -848,7 +903,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
struct uid_gid_map *parent_map)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
- struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ struct user_namespace *map_ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_map new_map;
unsigned idx;
struct uid_gid_extent extent;
@@ -895,7 +950,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
/*
* Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target.
*/
- if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, map_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out;
/* Parse the user data */
@@ -965,7 +1020,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
ret = -EPERM;
/* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */
- if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
+ if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, map_ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
@@ -1086,6 +1141,10 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
+
+ if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID && !verify_root_map(file, ns, new_map))
+ return false;
+
/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
* be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
*/
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-04-30 22:47:41 +0000