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-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/namespace.c13
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mount.h1
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c2
5 files changed, 23 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 887c1c955df8..ca239fc86d8d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
- if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
return;
if (task_no_new_privs(current))
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 9786a38d1681..aabe8e397fc3 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -3280,6 +3280,19 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(struct vfsmount *mnt, int *new_mnt_flags)
return !mnt_already_visible(ns, mnt, new_mnt_flags);
}
+bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ /*
+ * Foreign mounts (accessed via fchdir or through /proc
+ * symlinks) are always treated as if they are nosuid. This
+ * prevents namespaces from trusting potentially unsafe
+ * suid/sgid bits, file caps, or security labels that originate
+ * in other namespaces.
+ */
+ return !(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)) &&
+ current_in_userns(mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
+}
+
static struct ns_common *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct ns_common *ns = NULL;
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index f822c3c11377..54a594d49733 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ extern void mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern struct vfsmount *mntget(struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern struct vfsmount *mnt_clone_internal(struct path *path);
extern int __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt);
struct path;
extern struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(struct path *path);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e109e6dac858..14540bd78561 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -453,8 +453,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
if (!file_caps_enabled)
return 0;
- if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make
+ * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
+ * descendants.
+ */
if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a86d537eb79b..15541756eb07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2259,7 +2259,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
{
int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
- int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
+ int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
int rc;
if (!nnp && !nosuid)