summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c39
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h54
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c311
6 files changed, 410 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index b038cd0fae2e..06d54d9d20a5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -8,5 +8,7 @@ selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o
selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o
+selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
+
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fc774436a264..3d496eae1b47 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
#include "netif.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
@@ -3349,6 +3350,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
}
+
+ if (!err)
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
+
out:
return err;
}
@@ -3401,6 +3406,24 @@ static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
sk_free_security(sk);
}
+static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+
+ if (!sk)
+ return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl);
+
+ read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ isec = get_sock_isec(sk);
+
+ if (isec)
+ sock_sid = isec->sid;
+
+ read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ return sock_sid;
+}
+
static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err = 0;
@@ -3536,6 +3559,11 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
}
+ if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
+
out:
return err;
}
@@ -4380,6 +4408,16 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
.sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
.sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
+ .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
+ .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
+ .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
+ .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+ .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
+ .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
#endif
};
@@ -4491,6 +4529,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
#endif /* IPV6 */
+
out:
return err;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 1deb59e1b762..71aeb12f07c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -238,3 +238,5 @@
S_(SECCLASS_NSCD, NSCD__SHMEMHOST, "shmemhost")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom")
+ S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RELABELFROM, "relabelfrom")
+ S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index a78b5d59c9fc..d1d0996049e3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -908,6 +908,8 @@
#define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO 0x00000001UL
#define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM 0x00000002UL
+#define ASSOCIATION__RELABELFROM 0x00000004UL
+#define ASSOCIATION__RELABELTO 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e87996c6dd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
+
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
+
+/*
+ * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
+ */
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ if (!sk->sk_socket)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security;
+}
+
+
+static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
+{
+ /* NOTE: no sock occurs on ICMP reply, forwards, ... */
+ /* icmp_reply: authorize as kernel packet */
+ if (fl && fl->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
+ return SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ }
+
+ return SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+#else
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c4d87d4dca7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/*
+ * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
+ * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * USAGE:
+ * NOTES:
+ * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
+ * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
+ * ISSUES:
+ * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
+ * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
+ * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
+ */
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+#include <net/udp.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return (ctx &&
+ (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
+ (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
+ */
+static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used
+ * with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+
+ /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+ if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
+ if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM :
+ ((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO :
+ (ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))),
+ NULL);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
+ * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+
+ BUG_ON(!uctx);
+ BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX);
+
+ if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
+ uctx->ctx_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
+ ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+ ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
+ uctx+1,
+ ctx->ctx_len);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
+ ctx->ctx_len,
+ &ctx->ctx_sid);
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Does the subject have permission to set security or permission to
+ * do the relabel?
+ * Must be permitted to relabel from default socket type (process type)
+ * to specified context
+ */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ return rc;
+
+out:
+ *ctxp = 0;
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
+ * xfrm_policy.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ BUG_ON(!xp);
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
+ return err;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
+ * new for policy cloning.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
+{
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
+
+ old_ctx = old->security;
+
+ if (old_ctx) {
+ new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
+ old_ctx->ctx_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!new_ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
+ memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+{
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
+ * xfrm_state.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ BUG_ON(!x);
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
+ */
+void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
+ * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
+ * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
+ * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
+ * gone thru the IPSec process.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0;
+ struct sec_path *sp;
+
+ sp = skb->sp;
+
+ if (sp) {
+ /*
+ * __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok
+ * says that spi's match for policy and the socket.
+ *
+ * Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec;
+
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ goto accept;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto drop;
+
+accept:
+ return 0;
+
+drop:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
+ * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
+ * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
+ * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
+ * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ dst = skb->dst;
+
+ if (dst) {
+ struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+
+ for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+ dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+ goto accept;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto drop;
+
+accept:
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+drop:
+ return NF_DROP;
+}