diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing')
4 files changed, 93 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f2b6909155f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +What: security/secrets/coco +Date: February 2022 +Contact: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/secrets/coco, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver + if the EFI secret area is populated. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area". diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkback b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkback index a74dfe52dd76..7faf719af165 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkback +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkback @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/module/xen_blkback/parameters/buffer_squeeze_duration_ms Date: December 2019 KernelVersion: 5.6 -Contact: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> +Contact: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Description: When memory pressure is reported to blkback this option controls the duration in milliseconds that blkback will not @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/module/xen_blkback/parameters/feature_persistent Date: September 2020 KernelVersion: 5.10 -Contact: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> +Contact: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Description: Whether to enable the persistent grants feature or not. Note that this option only takes effect on newly created backends. diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkfront b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkfront index 61fd173fabfe..7f646c58832e 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkfront +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-xen-blkfront @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/module/xen_blkfront/parameters/feature_persistent Date: September 2020 KernelVersion: 5.10 -Contact: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> +Contact: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Description: Whether to enable the persistent grants feature or not. Note that this option only takes effect on newly created frontends. diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-platform-intel-ifs b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-platform-intel-ifs new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..486d6d2ff8a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-platform-intel-ifs @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +What: /sys/devices/virtual/misc/intel_ifs_<N>/run_test +Date: April 21 2022 +KernelVersion: 5.19 +Contact: "Jithu Joseph" <jithu.joseph@intel.com> +Description: Write <cpu#> to trigger IFS test for one online core. + Note that the test is per core. The cpu# can be + for any thread on the core. Running on one thread + completes the test for the core containing that thread. + Example: to test the core containing cpu5: echo 5 > + /sys/devices/platform/intel_ifs.<N>/run_test + +What: /sys/devices/virtual/misc/intel_ifs_<N>/status +Date: April 21 2022 +KernelVersion: 5.19 +Contact: "Jithu Joseph" <jithu.joseph@intel.com> +Description: The status of the last test. It can be one of "pass", "fail" + or "untested". + +What: /sys/devices/virtual/misc/intel_ifs_<N>/details +Date: April 21 2022 +KernelVersion: 5.19 +Contact: "Jithu Joseph" <jithu.joseph@intel.com> +Description: Additional information regarding the last test. The details file reports + the hex value of the SCAN_STATUS MSR. Note that the error_code field + may contain driver defined software code not defined in the Intel SDM. + +What: /sys/devices/virtual/misc/intel_ifs_<N>/image_version +Date: April 21 2022 +KernelVersion: 5.19 +Contact: "Jithu Joseph" <jithu.joseph@intel.com> +Description: Version (hexadecimal) of loaded IFS binary image. If no scan image + is loaded reports "none". + +What: /sys/devices/virtual/misc/intel_ifs_<N>/reload +Date: April 21 2022 +KernelVersion: 5.19 +Contact: "Jithu Joseph" <jithu.joseph@intel.com> +Description: Write "1" (or "y" or "Y") to reload the IFS image from + /lib/firmware/intel/ifs/ff-mm-ss.scan. |