diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S | 75 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S index 32051ec5b33f..99411fa91350 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <asm/asm-offsets.h> #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/uaccess-asm.h> #include <asm/v7m.h> @ Bad Abort numbers @@ -47,8 +48,7 @@ .macro alignment_trap, rtmp1, rtmp2, label #ifdef CONFIG_ALIGNMENT_TRAP mrc p15, 0, \rtmp2, c1, c0, 0 - ldr \rtmp1, \label - ldr \rtmp1, [\rtmp1] + ldr_va \rtmp1, \label teq \rtmp1, \rtmp2 mcrne p15, 0, \rtmp1, c1, c0, 0 #endif @@ -217,9 +217,7 @@ blne trace_hardirqs_off #endif .endif - ldr r1, [sp, #SVC_ADDR_LIMIT] - uaccess_restore - str r1, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] + uaccess_exit tsk, r0, r1 #ifndef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL @ ARM mode SVC restore @@ -263,9 +261,7 @@ @ on the stack remains correct). @ .macro svc_exit_via_fiq - ldr r1, [sp, #SVC_ADDR_LIMIT] - uaccess_restore - str r1, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] + uaccess_exit tsk, r0, r1 #ifndef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL @ ARM mode restore mov r0, sp @@ -295,6 +291,20 @@ .macro restore_user_regs, fast = 0, offset = 0 +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_32v6K) && \ + (!defined(CONFIG_CPU_V6) || defined(CONFIG_SMP)) +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V6 +ALT_SMP(nop) +ALT_UP_B(.L1_\@) +#endif + @ The TLS register update is deferred until return to user space so we + @ can use it for other things while running in the kernel + mrc p15, 0, r1, c13, c0, 3 @ get current_thread_info pointer + ldr r1, [r1, #TI_TP_VALUE] + mcr p15, 0, r1, c13, c0, 3 @ set TLS register +.L1_\@: +#endif + uaccess_enable r1, isb=0 #ifndef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL @ ARM mode restore @@ -356,25 +366,25 @@ * between user and kernel mode. */ .macro ct_user_exit, save = 1 -#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING +#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER .if \save stmdb sp!, {r0-r3, ip, lr} - bl context_tracking_user_exit + bl user_exit_callable ldmia sp!, {r0-r3, ip, lr} .else - bl context_tracking_user_exit + bl user_exit_callable .endif #endif .endm .macro ct_user_enter, save = 1 -#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING +#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER .if \save stmdb sp!, {r0-r3, ip, lr} - bl context_tracking_user_enter + bl user_enter_callable ldmia sp!, {r0-r3, ip, lr} .else - bl context_tracking_user_enter + bl user_enter_callable .endif #endif .endm @@ -418,3 +428,40 @@ scno .req r7 @ syscall number tbl .req r8 @ syscall table pointer why .req r8 @ Linux syscall (!= 0) tsk .req r9 @ current thread_info + + .macro do_overflow_check, frame_size:req +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + @ + @ Test whether the SP has overflowed. Task and IRQ stacks are aligned + @ so that SP & BIT(THREAD_SIZE_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT) should always be + @ zero. + @ +ARM( tst sp, #1 << (THREAD_SIZE_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT) ) +THUMB( tst r1, #1 << (THREAD_SIZE_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT) ) +THUMB( it ne ) + bne .Lstack_overflow_check\@ + + .pushsection .text +.Lstack_overflow_check\@: + @ + @ The stack pointer is not pointing to a valid vmap'ed stack, but it + @ may be pointing into the linear map instead, which may happen if we + @ are already running from the overflow stack. We cannot detect overflow + @ in such cases so just carry on. + @ + str ip, [r0, #12] @ Stash IP on the mode stack + ldr_va ip, high_memory @ Start of VMALLOC space +ARM( cmp sp, ip ) @ SP in vmalloc space? +THUMB( cmp r1, ip ) +THUMB( itt lo ) + ldrlo ip, [r0, #12] @ Restore IP + blo .Lout\@ @ Carry on + +THUMB( sub r1, sp, r1 ) @ Restore original R1 +THUMB( sub sp, r1 ) @ Restore original SP + add sp, sp, #\frame_size @ Undo svc_entry's SP change + b __bad_stack @ Handle VMAP stack overflow + .popsection +.Lout\@: +#endif + .endm |